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EXCLUSION  AND  EQUALITY:  HOW  EXCLUSION
FROM  THE  POLITICAL  PROCESS  RENDERS
RELIGIOUS  LIBERTY  UNEQUAL
Philip Hamburger*
ABSTRACT
Exclusion from the political process is a central question in American law.  Thus far, how-
ever, it has not been recognized how religious Americans are excluded from the political process
and what this means for religious equality.
Put simply, both administrative lawmaking and § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
substantially exclude religious Americans from the political process that produces laws.  As a
result, apparently equal laws are apt, in reality, to be unequal for religious Americans.  Political
exclusion threatens religious equality.
The primary practical conclusion concerns administrative law.  It will be seen that this sort
of “law” is made through a process that systematically excludes religious Americans and their
concerns and that it therefore is apt to be religiously unequal.  Courts should recognize this
inequality and so should take different approaches to administrative and statutory burdens on
religion.
Conceptually, the implications are even broader.  The free exercise of religion tends to be
understood in terms of a binary choice between equality or exemption.  The equality, however, is
undermined by the exclusion of religious Americans from the political process.  The conceptual
framework for understanding religious liberty should therefore be expanded to recognize how
exclusion tilts the entire game, giving even facially equal laws an underlying slant.
INTRODUCTION
When individuals or groups are denied full participation in the political
process, the resulting laws, even if formally equal, can easily become unequal
and oppressive, and this has become a serious danger for religious liberty.
Religious Americans are substantially excluded from the political process that
produces laws, and this prompts sobering questions about the reality of relig-
ious equality.  Put simply, political exclusion threatens religious equality.
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The exclusion is two-fold.  First, the exclusion arises from the growth of
federal administrative power, which leaves Americans, including religious
Americans, no opportunity to vote for or against their administrative
lawmakers.  Second, the exclusion comes from § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code.1  As a result of this section, even when law is made in Con-
gress, religious organizations are restricted in their petitioning and
campaigning for or against lawmakers.  In two ways, therefore, the law
broadly excludes religious Americans and their organizations from the politi-
cal process that shapes lawmaking.  Americans thereby have lost essential
mechanisms for persuading their lawmakers to avoid burdening their relig-
ious beliefs.
Religious liberty thus comes with an unexpected slant.  Courts blithely
assume that America offers a flat or even legal landscape—a broad and equi-
table surface on which all Americans can enjoy rights equally, regardless of
their religion.  The underlying exclusion, however, tilts the entire game, so
that many apparently equal laws actually lean against religion.
This exclusion hollows out the religious equality guaranteed by the Free
Exercise Clause.  Even where the courts protect this equality, the exclusion is
apt to render laws unequal and oppressive.
As a practical matter, the exclusion raises questions as to whether even
facially equal laws—laws that do not discriminate on the basis of religion—
are always really equal.  On account of the systematic character of the admin-
istrative exclusion, administrative law is particularly apt to be slanted against
religious Americans, and this Article therefore suggests that, at the very least,
the courts should distinguish between administrative and statutory burdens
on religion.
Conceptually, the exclusion points to the need for a more expansive
understanding of religious liberty.  The central question about the free exer-
cise of religion is usually framed in binary terms of exemption or equality—in
terms of one variant or another of either a freedom from equal laws on
account of one’s religion or a freedom under equal laws regardless of one’s
religion.2  The conceptual problem, however, turns out to be more compli-
cated, for the equality is undermined by exclusion.  Therefore, in addition to
the constitutional choices between exemption and equality, one must also
consider the role of exclusion.
1 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
2 The literature is enormous.  The leading argument for a constitutional right of
exemption is Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).  Among the arguments to the contrary are:
Philip Hamburger, Religious Freedom in Philadelphia, 54 EMORY L.J. 1603 (2005) [hereinafter
Hamburger, Religious Freedom] (arguing contra); Philip Hamburger, More is Less, 90 VA. L.
REV. 835 (2004) [hereinafter Hamburger, More is Less]; Philip Hamburger, A Constitutional
Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992)
[hereinafter Hamburger, Right of Religious Exemption].
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General and Focused.  The exclusion of religious Americans from the
political process comes in administrative power and in federal taxation.  Put
another way, it is both general and focused.
The general exclusion arises from the inability of Americans to vote for
or against their administrative lawmakers.  For example, the administrators
who adopt rules, interpretations, guidance documents, exemptions, and waiv-
ers are unelected by Americans.  Of course, this broad exclusion of all Ameri-
cans may not initially seem especially burdensome on religious Americans,
but consider the constitutional and administrative context.  On the one
hand, the Constitution expressly protects religious liberty.  On the other
hand, administrative lawmaking is designed to be “rational” and “scientific”
rather than responsive to political pressures, and this has religious implica-
tions.  Although administrative lawmaking is not really very rational or scien-
tific, its self-conscious rationalism and scientism leads administrative
lawmakers to be relatively indifferent, if not unsympathetic to religious con-
cerns, and the general exclusion of Americans from choosing their adminis-
trative lawmakers therefore comes with a distinctively hard edge for many
religious Americans.  This is not to say that lawmaking should be antagonistic
to science or otherwise irrational, let alone that it should be religious, but
rather that administrative lawmakers are not typically as sensitive to religious
sensibilities as are representative lawmakers—the sort of lawmakers that
Americans have a right to expect in a republic.  Administrative lawmaking
thus excludes religious Americans from the sort of participation in the politi-
cal process by which they ordinarily could protect themselves from religiously
burdensome laws.
A more focused exclusion comes in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code, which bars religious, educational, and charitable organizations from
campaigning and from much petitioning of government.3  This exclusion
singles out religious organizations, together with other idealistic organiza-
tions, for restrictions on their constitutional rights of political speech and of
assembling to petition.  Business and labor organizations, which represent
particular interests and thus (in the government’s view) are not purely ideal-
istic, are not subject to such severe restrictions on their constitutional rights.
Section 501(c)(3) thus distinguishes between idealistic and other organiza-
tions.  And in thereby suppressing the petitioning and political speech of
churches, it deprives religious Americans of essential channels for avoiding
the religious burdens of statutory and administrative constraints.  The cost (it
3 The section excludes business organizations by enumerating
[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual . . . .
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).  Labor organizations are covered by § 501(c)(5).
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will be seen) is apt to be especially high for religious minorities who are theo-
logically orthodox or who otherwise have beliefs that leave them relatively
dependent on their churches for political participation.
Both types of exclusion can be illustrated by the regulations underlying
the recent Supreme Court decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.  The
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued administrative
rules under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requiring employers to provide
their employees with health insurance covering contraception.4  In response,
Hobby Lobby—a closely held business corporation—protested that it had
religious objections to providing such insurance.5  Religious Americans,
including those associated with Hobby Lobby, traditionally might have used
the political process to avoid a religiously burdensome requirement of this
sort.  Under administrative power, however, they cannot vote for their admin-
istrative lawmakers; under § 501(c)(3), moreover, they cannot use their relig-
ious organizations to campaign or substantially to lobby against such
requirements.  Religious Americans thereby are significantly excluded from
the political process, and they consequently must live under laws that,
although equal in form, are not really equal.6
4 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2751, 2754 (2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4)).  The Court held that a
closely held business corporation whose owners objected to the contraception mandate
imposed by regulations issued under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) are exempted from
the regulations by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Id. at 2785.
5 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2755.
6 Some basic definitions should be noted here.
“Administrative lawmaking” is understood here to mean all administrative edicts that
serve a lawmaking function and that are binding on the public.  Administrative rules or
regulations are the central example of such lawmaking, but the relevant pronouncements
also include lawmaking interpretation and guidance and all administrative exemptions,
waivers, and adjudications that adjust any such rule, interpretation, or guidance or that
otherwise serve to make law.
The word “organization” is used here as a convenient label for any society or associa-
tion, whether or not incorporated.
When summarizing § 501(c)(3) in concrete terms, this Article speaks of “churches,”
“schools,” and “charities,” and it thereby means any such organization “no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”  26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3).
The term “church” is used in this Article to mean any religious association or organiza-
tion, regardless of its religion or size, and regardless of whether it is a particular congrega-
tion or a larger religious association or organization.
“Religious equality” (as already suggested) is used here as a shorthand for a freedom
under equal laws, regardless of one’s religion—meaning (as explained in Part II) a free-
dom from penalty or unequal legal constraint.  Of course, freedom under equal laws as
presented by this Article is not the only possible concept that could be described as relig-
ious equality.  For example, even a constitutional right of religious exemption—a right to
be free from equal laws on account of one’s religion—could be described as equal in that
it is guaranteed equally to all Americans.  From this perspective, however, almost any con-
stitutional guarantee of religious liberty, even an overtly discriminatory guarantee, could
be described as equal.
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Different Paths for Oppression.  The problem becomes even more sobering
when one places it in the history of religious oppression.  Over the centuries,
religious oppression has shifted paths.
The route for oppression used to be through unequal legal constraints.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, England and most American
colonies unabashedly preserved their power to impose constraints on the
basis of religious dissent.7  The U.S. Constitution, however, and eventually
most state constitutions, barred such discrimination, and these constitutions
thereby established freedom under equal laws—meaning that persons could
not be constrained on account of their religion.8
Religious oppression, however, did not disappear; instead, it took other
avenues.  Although the laws could not constrain unequally, there remained
the question of who would make the laws.  Many Protestants increasingly wor-
ried about the political participation of Catholics, and repeatedly therefore,
from the eighteenth century to the twentieth, many Protestants attempted to
prevent Catholics from holding office and even occasionally attempted to
prevent them from voting.9  When these paths were no longer possible, many
Protestants (in the early 1920s) sought compulsory education of future voters
in public schools or attempted (for example, in 1928 and 1960) to sway vot-
ers with systematic appeals to prejudice.10
Fortunately, there is now legal equality in suffrage and office holding,
and overt appeals to religious prejudice are widely (even if not consistently)
viewed as tasteless.  But even with legal equality in religious belief, in qualifi-
cations for office, and in voting, and even with increasing social equality in
rejections of prejudice, there has remained much anxiety about religion.
Although this fearfulness has often remained focused on the Catholic
Church, most of the anxiety has also extended out to a much broader range
of religious and other idealistic organizations, and it has found a new outlet
in barriers to political participation: the exclusion of Americans from voting
for administrative lawmakers and § 501(c)(3)’s limits on campaigning and
petitioning.  Barriers to Catholic office holding and voting have thus been
replaced with more general restrictions on petitioning and speech and even
broader barriers in the removal of lawmaking from the legislature.
On the whole, the law nowadays is religiously equal—in that it does not
impose restraints on account of religion and thus allows freedom under
equal laws—but it is politically exclusionary.  Even while the law declares
itself to be equal as to religion, it is unequal in a key point: it deprives Ameri-
cans, notably religious Americans, of the political participation that would
allow them to resist equal but oppressive laws.
7 Hamburger, More is Less, supra note 2, at 840–42, 850–53; Hamburger, Right of Relig-
ious Exemption, supra note 2, at 918–23.  Both articles observe how England, its colonies,
and some states protected toleration, meaning a conditional freedom, thus leaving room
for penalties on dissenting religion, where the conditions were not met.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9 PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 235, 404–05 (2002).
10 Id.
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This is a mockery of the law’s much vaunted equality.  The law guaran-
tees religious Americans legal equality under the Free Exercise Clause.  It
more generally secures equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment.  At the same time, however, it excludes Americans, not least
religious Americans, from much of the political process, and it thereby leaves
them vulnerable to laws that come down hard on their religious beliefs.  Even
equal laws thus are apt to be unequal.11
Prior Scholarship.  Exclusion from the political process is not entirely a
new question for religious liberty.  But the way in which exclusion from the
political process undermines the Constitution’s religious liberty has not thus
far been recognized.
In his famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., Justice
Stone worried about exclusions from the political process, such as “restric-
tions upon the right to vote” and “restraints upon the dissemination of infor-
mation.”12  He also feared that “statutes directed at particular religious . . .
minorities” and other “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities”
might have the effect of “curtail[ing] the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”13
Stone’s footnote is an interesting recognition of the political process and
some basic threats to it, but it is only a beginning.  First, although Stone
acknowledged the danger for insular and discrete minorities, he missed the
danger for more complexly defined groups. For example, as observed by
Bruce Ackerman, judges often should be concerned about “anonymous and
diffuse” minorities.14  Of special interest here, when Stone mentioned attacks
on particular religious minorities, he ignored the growing danger of more
ecumenical or liberal assaults on churches and idealistic groups in general.
Second, and even more basically, he offered only a generic theory about
exclusion from the political process.  He thereby failed to recognize that
restrictions on political participation might alter the character of specific
constitutional rights—in this instance, the free exercise of religion.  Thus, at
least for purposes of this Article, Stone’s approach in Carolene Products is too
narrow in its understanding of excluded minorities and too generic in not
focusing on the First Amendment.
This Article therefore takes a very different approach.  Rather than rely
on Stone’s theory in Carolene Products, it rests more concretely on the Consti-
11 Similarly, costs under equal laws can be observed in the exclusion of women and
blacks from voting.  Such exclusion often left these groups at a profound disadvantage.
And the exclusion hurt these groups not merely because of discriminatory laws, but per-
haps even more frequently because of laws that were nondiscriminatory, or equal, on their
face.  Not having been made with the direct input of women and blacks, even equal laws
were apt to bear down hard on them.
12 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
13 Id. at 152 n.4.
14 Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L.R. 713, 724 (1995).
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tution’s guarantee of free exercise.15  And rather than confine its analysis to
any one “insular and discrete” religious minority, it explores the exclusion of
a wider range of religious Americans.
This approach to exclusion under the Free Exercise Clause stands in
sharp contrast to the work of Abner Greene.  His scholarship focuses on
exclusion in the context of the Constitution’s religious liberty, but rather
than recognize how exclusion from the political process undermines the First
Amendment’s religious liberty, his scholarship argues that exclusion is the
foundation of this freedom.  According to Greene, if religious Americans
could enact legislation “for the express purpose of advancing the values
believed to be commanded by religion,” this would result in “the exclusion of
nonbelievers from meaningful political debate.”16  The Establishment
Clause, he adds, solves this problem by making it “unconstitutional to base
law expressly on religious faith.”17  And because this solution in turn
“excludes religious believers from full political participation,” the Free Exer-
cise Clause “mitigates the effects of that exclusion” by securing religious
exemptions from law.18  Each step of this theory seems dubious, but more to
the point here, the theory treats exclusion as the basis for the Constitution’s
religious liberty, not as a threat to it.19
In fact, exclusion from the political process is a profound threat to relig-
ious liberty.  For more than two decades, judges and scholars have tried to
figure out whether the Free Exercise Clause guarantees equality or exemp-
tion—whether it secures a freedom under equal laws, without regard to one’s
religion, or a freedom from equal laws precisely on account of one’s religion.
In addition, however, to the choice between equality and exemption, there is
another factor, exclusion.  The exclusion of Americans from participation in
the political process transforms the Constitution’s apparently equal liberty
into something that, in reality, is grossly unequal.
Implications for Free Exercise of Religion.  The exclusion of Americans from
the political process has profound implications for the First Amendment’s
free exercise of religion.  This religious liberty usually is considered on its
own, as if it existed in a political vacuum, without any consideration of how it
15 Of course, this Article has implications for Stone’s theory in Carolene Products,
because if the theory is to remain even theoretically persuasive, judges cannot ignore its
application to the exclusion of religious Americans.  The argument here, however, rests
merely on the Constitution’s guarantee of free exercise.
16 Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611,
1613–14 (1992).
17 Id. at 1614.
18 Id.; see also ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 149–57 (2012).
19 Greene’s argument seems mistaken (a) in assuming that religious participation in
legislation would result in “the exclusion of nonbelievers from meaningful political
debate,” (b) in assuming that the Establishment Clause makes it unconstitutional “to base
law expressly on religious faith,” and (c) in assuming that that the Free Exercise Clause
secures religious exemptions from law.  Greene, supra note 18, at 1614.
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is altered by barriers to political participation.  It therefore is time to examine
what happens when the First Amendment assures freedom under equal laws,
but the government excludes Americans from the process of making law.  On
account of this exclusion, even religious equality is apt to become oppressive.
The need to understand the implications becomes especially pressing
because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith.20
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority of the Court concludes that, under
the Free Exercise Clause, there typically is no right of religious exemption
from general laws.21  His opinion, in other words, understands the Free Exer-
cise Clause to provide for equality rather than exemption—for freedom
under equal laws, regardless of one’s religion, rather than freedom from
equal laws on account of one’s religion.  Even in the best of circumstances,
however, equal laws will rub against the religious views of some persons, and
Justice Scalia’s opinion therefore aptly notes (as will be seen in Part II) that
religious liberty rests on a combination of legal and political protection.  In
courts Americans can claim constitutional equality, and in legislatures they
can seek statutory exemptions and other statutory relief.  Protection from the
burdens of general laws thus comes in the political process.22
The law, however, significantly excludes Americans and especially relig-
ious Americans from this process.  It therefore must be asked how the Free
Exercise Clause and the doctrine in Smith should be applied where the courts
are open but the political process is not.  In such circumstances, even facially
equal laws are not always really equal.  Therefore (as will be seen in Part VI)
courts should, at the very least, distinguish between statutory and administra-
tive burdens on religious belief.
Argument.  This Article most centrally argues that political exclusion has
undermined religious equality.  To be precise, the freedom under equal laws,
regardless of one’s religion, loses much of its value in the context of the
administrative and the § 501(c)(3) exclusions from the political process.
Indeed, because of the exclusions, apparently equal laws are apt to be une-
qual and oppressive.
The organization follows six main points.  First, the argument about
exclusion comes with some basic caveats and counter-examples.  Second, the
Free Exercise Clause (as understood traditionally and in Smith) rests on the
political logic that religious Americans can protect themselves from oppres-
sion under equal laws by engaging in politics.  This, however, assumes that
religious Americans enjoy full and equal political participation.  In fact,
third, administrative lawmaking excludes all Americans from political partici-
pation, and it excludes religious American with a distinctive edge.  Fourth,
§ 501(c)(3) denies political participation to religious and other idealistic
organizations.  Fifth, § 501(c)(3)’s exclusion of religious organizations from
the political process is part of a broader tendency to impose narrowly special-
20 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
21 Id. at 888–89.
22 Id. at 890.
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ized ends on idealistic organizations in ways that treat them and their mem-
bers as only fractions of persons with only fractions of rights, and in the case
of religious organizations, the effect is to curtail the freedom of individuals to
organize in politics in defense of religious freedom.  Having shown how relig-
ious Americans have lost their means of avoiding oppression under equal
laws, this Article, in Part VI, considers whether, as a result of the exclusion,
even facially equal laws are sometimes in fact religiously unequal, and on this
basis, it suggests possible judicial remedies, including different approaches to
administrative and statutory burdens on religion.
I. CAVEATS AND COUNTER-EXAMPLES
The argument here about exclusions comes with caveats and counter-
examples.  Rather than peripheral, these cautions are at the core of the argu-
ment, for they simultaneously demarcate the limits of the claim and suggest
its strength.
A. Caveats and Clarifications
Some basic caveats can clarify the argument about exclusion.23
Broad Exclusions and Narrower Effects.  When this Article observes that
religious Americans, or their organizations, are excluded from the political
process, it does not mean that they are the only ones excluded.  Administra-
tive power excludes all Americans from voting for their administrative
lawmakers, and although § 501(c)(3) mentions religious organizations, it
also mentions educational and charitable organizations.  These exclusions
therefore have a wide range of consequences, not all of which are religious.
From a sociological perspective, the exclusion of Americans from voting
for their administrative lawmakers has serious consequences for local, class,
and other interests.  From a constitutional point of view, § 501(c)(3)’s exclu-
sion of idealistic organizations is a problem not only for religious liberty but
also for freedom of speech and the press.24
This Article, however, focuses only on the religious consequences—
indeed, only on a narrow range of religious consequences: the implications
for the religious liberty enjoyed by Americans under the Free Exercise
Clause.25  Whatever their effects in excluding nonreligious Americans from
23 Note also the definitions in supra note 6.
24 As will be discussed below in Parts IV and V, § 501(c)(3) excludes not only religious
organizations but also educational and charitable organizations—the result being to tamp
down the role of idealistic organizations in American politics, as if their speech were more
dangerous and worrisome than that of business organizations and labor unions, let alone
political parties.  The effects of the exclusion on speech rights, however, is not the subject
of this study.
25 This Article only briefly touches on the consequences of § 501(c)(3) for the free-
dom enjoyed under the Establishment Clause.  Tellingly, as will be seen, the section’s
restrictions arose in the context of theologically liberal anxieties, and these restrictions
have undermined the capacity of relatively orthodox religious organizations to resist theo-
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the political process, administrative power and § 501(c)(3) severely diminish
the ability of religious Americans to protect their interests in the religious
equality guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.26
Only Partial Exclusion.  When this Article says that religious Americans or
their organizations are excluded from the political process, it means not that
they are entirely excluded, but merely that they are unequally or otherwise
significantly excluded.  Religious Americans and their organizations still have
many avenues for securing their interests in congressional and administrative
power.  But religious Americans now are much limited in their central, con-
stitutionally established paths for securing their legislative interests—namely,
in their right of political speech in campaigns, their right to assemble to peti-
tion, and their right to vote for their lawmakers (at least when law is of the
administrative kind).  They thus are excluded from the political process—not
entirely, but very significantly.
Differential Effects.  In discussing exclusion, this Article generalizes about
Americans and especially about religious Americans, but it should be under-
stood to do so with a caveat.  Not all Americans, or even religious Americans,
are equally excluded from the political process or suffer equally.  And the
differential effects accentuate the problem.
All Americans are excluded from voting for their administrative
lawmakers, but only religious Americans thereby suffer in their free exercise
interests.  Even among religious Americans, there are differences, for the
costs are apt to be particularly high among the relatively orthodox, whose
religious beliefs are particularly apt to depart in salient ways from the central-
ized rationalism and the scientism (one cannot quite call it rationality and
science) that prevails among administrators.
Similarly, § 501(c)(3) has differential effects—even among religious
organizations.  All religious organizations are excluded from campaigning
and substantial petitioning, but religious Americans who are particularly
dependent on their own religious institutions when engaging in politics are
especially likely to suffer as a result of § 501(c)(3).
Consider, for example, the effects on at least some of the orthodox.
Americans with theologically liberal beliefs are not particularly confined to
logically liberal interpretations of the Establishment Clause—not to mention their capacity
to influence the laws adopted under those interpretations. See Section V.C.  Like the impli-
cations for speech rights, however, the Establishment Clause implications deserve much
more attention than they can receive here.
26 That broad exclusions have narrower effects should not be a surprise.  Prior to the
mid-nineteenth century, some states excluded unpropertied white men from voting, and
although this adversely affected all such men, it also had more focused results.  For exam-
ple, under the exclusions of unpropertied white men, equal laws tended to protect farmers
more than mere employees.  Only after unpropertied men secured the right to vote did
employees gradually secure greater legislative protection.  Similarly, in England, only after
the passage of the 1832 Reform Bill did Parliament adopt legislation reforming
workplaces.
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working through their own churches.27  Substantively, they often have beliefs
aligned with popular political views; procedurally, they rarely feel obliged to
pursue their religious beliefs within their own churches’ lines of authority;
and for both reasons, they are apt to have other avenues for protecting their
beliefs.  In contrast, religious Americans with relatively orthodox views often
cannot so easily bring their religious beliefs into politics.  Procedurally, they
tend to feel bound to the religious authority of their churches, and some
therefore feel obliged to strive for religious liberty through their churches.
Substantively, moreover, their orthodoxy tends to be a mode of setting them-
selves apart from prevailing views, and it therefore can stand in the way of
their forming broad political alliances.  On both grounds, there is reason to
think that they are more likely than theological liberals to be dependent on
their churches for religious engagement in politics.  Section 501(c)(3)’s
exclusion thus appears to have distinctively severe consequences for at least
some religiously orthodox Americans.
Of course, if one associates orthodoxy with majority views or conformity
to such views, one will not be apt to worry about the fate of the orthodox.  In
the contemporary America, however—a very diverse society that has long
tended toward theological liberalism—orthodoxy is apt to be the stance of
minorities that seek to preserve their distinctive beliefs in the face of
majoritarian pressures to conform to more universal liberal views.  Put sim-
ply, in a theologically liberal society, orthodoxy is unorthodox.
The exclusion, however, is not confined to some of the orthodox, for it
more generally affects all who are dependent on their own churches for
bringing their religious concerns into the political sphere, including the non-
orthodox whose religious beliefs are not easily aligned with popular political
opinion.  Such persons can be relatively dependent on their own churches
for pursuing their religious interests in politics and therefore are more
excluded than others.
The exclusion thus comes with theological discrimination—not simply
against the religious, but more precisely against the relatively orthodox and
others who are dependent on their own churches in politics.  Consequently,
although the exclusion’s effects are not uniform, this is not to say they are
insubstantial or that they do not seriously affect religion.  On the contrary,
precisely because the exclusion tends to be most effective in cutting some
minority religious beliefs out the political process, it is particularly
worrisome.
Federal Rather than State Exclusion.  This Article focuses on the exclusion
of religious Americans from the federal political process—on the barriers to
their protecting themselves from religiously burdensome lawmaking by Con-
gress or federal administrative agencies.  Obviously, religious Americans are
similarly excluded from state political processes, and the argument here
27 In light of this Article’s use of the word “church” (explained supra, note 6), the
relatively orthodox Americans discussed here include not only some Christians but also
some Jews, some Muslims, and so forth.
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could therefore be extended, with some variation, to the states.  For simplic-
ity’s sake, however, this Article confines itself to exclusion from the federal
political process.
Anti-Catholicism Only a Background Explanation.  In explaining the exclu-
sion imposed by § 501(c)(3), this Article harks back to the section’s cultural
origins, including aspects of anti-Catholicism.  But the argument is not that
anything as narrow as anti-Catholicism produced § 501(c)(3).  On the con-
trary, although anti-Catholicism supplied the model and the vocabulary for
the exclusion carried out through § 501(c)(3), the motivating anxiety
extended out to a broader theologically liberal fear about a wide range of
religious and other idealistic organizations.  The anti-Catholicism thus
reveals an important historical foundation, but (as will be seen in Part IV) the
concerns that animated the adoption of § 501(c)(3)’s restrictions reached
much further.
Limited Role of Constitutional Arguments.  In making its broad argument
about exclusion and equality, this Article does not delve much into the con-
stitutional arguments against administrative power or § 501(c)(3).  The con-
stitutional problems with these things are interesting.  The focus here,
however, is on the larger problem that administrative power and § 501(c)(3)
exclude religious Americans from political participation and thereby limit
their capacity to protect themselves under equal laws.  It is especially impor-
tant for this to be understood by readers who are unpersuaded by the consti-
tutional objections.  One can run from the particular constitutional
difficulties, but one cannot hide from the reality of exclusion and its signifi-
cance for equality.
B. Counter-Examples and Complexity
Throughout this Article, counter-examples will come to mind.  And this
is to be expected, for although religious Americans and their organizations
are excluded from political participation in some ways, they remain able to
participate in other ways.  The results on the ground are therefore complex.
But the existence of counter-examples and complexity does not mean there
is no exclusion or that it does not undermine religious equality.
One sort of counter-example can be found in political alliances.  Many
roughly orthodox Americans (whether more or less Calvinist Christians,
Orthodox Jews, or others) ally themselves with the Republican Party, and
many more or less theologically liberal Americans (whether liberal Chris-
tians, Reform Jews, or others) ally themselves with the Democratic Party.28
28 Of course, such theological labels mean little except in context.  For example, many
evangelicals are theologically liberal by traditional standards, but could be considered, rel-
atively, to have some sense of orthodoxy when they believe in the inerrancy of scripture.
Although many theologically orthodox Jews speak of themselves as Orthodox, some do
not, and large numbers of theologically liberal Jews think of themselves as part of the
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These broad (and often overstated) alliances, however, touch merely the sur-
face of religious engagement in politics.
As already hinted, the exclusion of religious Americans from the politi-
cal process has different consequences for different groups.  Individuals who
do not feel obliged to work through their churches or whose beliefs are suffi-
ciently aligned with popular political views—that is, most theologically liberal
individuals and many others—can often rely on nonreligious forces in the
society to protect their beliefs from federal law.  Less extensively, but still on a
broad scale, the religious groups—both liberal and orthodox—that are large
enough (at least within the lines of electoral districts) and that are at least
roughly aligned with popular political views have the opportunity to form
effective alliances with national political parties.
Indeed, precisely because churches are excluded from direct participa-
tion in politics, such religious groups have added reasons to seek party alli-
ances.  Thus, even at a time when many hope for diminished alliances
between religious groups and political parties, the exclusion probably
encourages religious groups to seek out parties as conduits for their religious
views.  It may be doubted whether the resulting pressures for the assimilation
of religious and political views are really desirable on either side, but the
political parties offer at least some religious groups a forceful, albeit narrow,
avenue for political participation.
At the same time, one must worry about the host of other groups that
are more dependent on their churches to express their religious beliefs in
politics.  Whereas the exclusion may push some Americans into the hands of
the political parties, it leaves many others relatively dependent on their
churches for religious participation in elections and legislation.  Consider
the fate of Americans whose theological orthodoxy, politically unconven-
tional views, or small numbers leave them outside the ambit of religious alli-
ances with political parties.  They cannot expect much from the parties, and
when they seek to participate on their own, they find that they are excluded:
They cannot vote for their administrative lawmakers, they cannot speak
through their churches in legislative campaigns, and they cannot substan-
tially devote themselves in their churches to petitioning.  They have the First
Amendment freedom of living under equal laws—meaning that on the whole
they are not penalized on account of their religion—except that they are
excluded from the political process that makes equal laws.
Thus, rather than disprove the exclusion, theological alliances with polit-
ical parties show the complexity of the situation.  Of course, religious Ameri-
cans and their organizations have sometimes succeeded in protecting
themselves through party alliances, but at the same time they have been
Conservative movement, the Reform movement, or simply as unattached—not as theologi-
cally liberal.  As for Muslims, the word “orthodox” is rarely used.  Unsurprisingly, the
meaning of the word often becomes increasingly unclear as one moves away from the
traditions in which it has familiar usage.  Nonetheless, although most Americans do not
primarily describe themselves as theologically orthodox or liberal, these labels still are
revealing.
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severely excluded from the political process, and this has particularly fateful
consequences for the religious minorities who are most dependent on their
churches for engaging in politics.
A second type of counter-example that cuts against this Article’s argu-
ment about exclusion can be found in the success of some statutory exemp-
tions.  Even before the Supreme Court in Smith backed away from a
constitutional right of religious exemption, there were occasions when the
Court sometimes refused to find such an exemption, but Congress
responded by granting a statutory exemption.  In Goldman v. Weinberger, a
Jewish Air Force officer objected to Air Force regulations barring headgear
indoors, and after the Court upheld the regulations, Congress offered statu-
tory relief.29  In Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery, Native Americans objected to fed-
eral plans to build a timber road on federal land sacred to Native Americans,
and when the Court upheld the plan, Congress protected the land by stat-
ute.30  Most dramatically, shortly after the Smith decision, Congress adopted
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.31  And when the application of this
statute to the states was questioned by the Court, Congress passed the Relig-
ious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.32  Thus, at least during the
heyday of late twentieth-century evangelical participation in politics, there
were instances when religious Americans successfully obtained legislative
relief.
Tellingly, however, these were situations in which religious objections to
law enjoyed widespread sympathy from both right and left.33  On many
issues, religious Americans and their organizations increasingly cannot mus-
29 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); see National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, § 508, 101 Stat. 1019, 1086–87
(1987).
30 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see Smith River
National Recreation Area Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460bbb–460bbb-11 (2012); Wilderness Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136.
31 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012),
invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
32 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc–2000cc-5.
33 As put by J. Brent Walker of the Baptist Joint Committee, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act was secured by “a coalition of religious and civil liberties groups” that
“spanned the religious and political spectrum from left to right: evangelicals and mainline
Protestants, Jews and Muslims, Roman Catholics and Lutherans, Sikhs and Scientologists,
and the ACLU and the Traditional Values Coalition.”  J. Brent Walker, Remembering the
Origins of RFRA, REPORT FROM THE CAPITAL, Oct. 2013, at 3, available at http://bjconline
.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/October-2013-RFTC.pdf.  They “put aside their theo-
logical and political disagreements and former weapons of rhetorical warfare to join
forces.” Id.
The provision of the National Defense Authorization Act that provided relief in situa-
tions such as Goldman was only a small part of large bill, but it was adopted by a voice vote
of the whole House of Representatives.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 1988 and 1989, § 508, 101 Stat. 1019, 1086–1087; see 133 CONG. REC. 11851–53 (May
8, 1987).  In getting relief from the decision in Lyng, Native Americans had powerful allies
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ter such support.  Especially when they seek to protect relatively orthodox
beliefs, or when they want to adhere to religious duties that are not aligned
with popular liberal political views, religious Americans often find themselves
alone.  In Goldman v. Weinberger, where Jewish orthodoxy conflicted with the
military’s sense of discipline, there was political support for congressional
relief, but on the whole, the orthodox beliefs or practices of any group in any
religion in contemporary America is apt to set the group apart.  Of particular
interest here, such beliefs are less likely than theologically liberal beliefs to be
the basis of political cooperation in a large, diverse nation.  It therefore offers
no solace to relatively orthodox or other nonconforming religious Americans
to tell them that more liberal religious groups, or those with beliefs more
aligned with popular views, have found broad political support.
Put simply, the religious Americans least able to secure allies are at great-
est risk from the exclusion.  Those who are sailing with prevailing winds, the-
ological and political, do not suffer much from the exclusion.  Those who are
tacking against prevailing winds, however, have much to fear.  It is difficult
enough in the political realm to sail against the wind, and it is even worse
when the law excludes one from the political process.
II. THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Constitutional rights do not stand alone.  They need to be examined in
context, and for the free exercise of religion, an essential context is access to
the political process.
Like all constitutional rights, the free exercise of religion is a limited
freedom.  At least as understood historically, and in Smith, it guarantees free-
dom under equal laws, without regard to one’s religion, not a freedom from
equal laws on account of one’s religion.  And precisely because its equality
can bear down hard on persons of nonconforming beliefs, it is crucial that
Americans enjoy the political freedom to secure statutory relief.
In other words, persons disappointed with what they can get in court
need to be able to turn to Congress and state legislatures; they need to be
able campaign, vote, and petition.  In broader terms, there is a political logic
to the boundaries of the free exercise of religion.  Although equal access to
the political process is not a measure or condition of the constitutional right,
it is an essential part of the logic that justifies the measured character of the
right.
among conservationists.  16 U.S.C. §§ 460bbb–460bbb-11; see H.R. REP. NO. 101-707
(1990).
One might think that limits on the speech and petitioning of nonconforming minori-
ties has little cost for religious groups not aligned with popular political views, because
even with the freedom of speech and of petitioning, they would be unlikely to succeed in
the political sphere.  Indeed, they often are not successful.  The Constitution, however,
guarantees its freedom of speech to all Americans, including minorities, and it thereby
gives them at least a fighting chance to persuade others, to find allies, to secure sympathy,
and thereby to prevail.
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A. The Generous but Limited Historical Character of Free Exercise
The political logic of free exercise, as traditionally understood, arises
from the generous but limited character of this right.  All constitutional
rights are generous in some sense and yet limited, and the limit to free exer-
cise is what makes it so important for Americans to have recourse to legisla-
tures.  Accordingly, before exploring the political avenue for redress, Part II
must observe what cannot be obtained in court.
Obviously, the free exercise of religion has been much debated, and
there is no need to pursue it in detail here.  Instead, what matters here is
simply that this right (as understood traditionally and in Smith) is limited in a
way that leaves much to the political process.  Both the history and the text of
the Free Exercise Clause reveal that it protected a freedom from penalty or
from discriminatory constraint—that is, a freedom under equal laws—thus
allowing Americans to obtain relief from unequal constraints in court, but
leaving them to secure exemptions from equal laws in legislatures.34
Generous but Limited.  On the one hand, the Free Exercise Clause was a
generous grant of liberty.  The religious liberty traditionally protected in
England was merely toleration, which left room for penalties on account of
one’s religion.  The English had much experience during the seventeenth
century with religious opposition to law, and even had fought a civil war
partly around this question.  They therefore were reluctant to grant more
than toleration—as evident in the 1689 Toleration Act.35  Under the policy
of toleration, the government offered religious minorities much religious lib-
erty, but only conditionally, so that the government could penalize wayward
minorities if they seemed dangerous.  Toleration thus preserved the possibil-
ity of discriminatory constraints.
This was the standard pursued by many American colonies and, after the
Revolution, by many of the states.36  For example, even if the Toleration Act
applied in colonial Virginia (and this was disputed in the early 1770s), Bap-
tists needed to get a license before preaching, and where they did not meet
this condition, they often were imprisoned.37  In opposition to this mere tol-
34 On account of this traditional understanding of the Free Exercise Clause—as a
guarantee of freedom from penalty or discriminatory constraint—this Article focuses on
the implications of the exclusion for laws that constrain.  The exclusion, however, also has
consequences for laws that grant privileges and that therefore more clearly raise Establish-
ment Clause questions. See infra note 48.
35 An Act for exempting their Majestyes Protestant Subjects Dissenting from the
Church of England from the Penalties of Certaine Lawes, 1689, 1 W & M, c. 18, (Eng.)
reprinted in 6 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 74 (1819).
36 Hamburger, More is Less, supra note 2, at 840–42, 850–53; Hamburger, Right of Relig-
ious Exemption, supra note 2, at 918–23.  Both articles observe how England, its colonies,
and some states protected toleration—meaning a conditional freedom—thus leaving room
for penalties on dissenting religion, where the conditions were not met.
37 As put by a lawyer who thought the English Toleration Act applied in the colony,
“you are entitled to all the Benefit of that Act, provided you comply with the Terms of it.”
An Address to the Anabaptists Imprisoned in Caroline County, August 8, 1771, THE VIRGINIA
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eration, the Virginia Free Exercise Clause, and eventually the Federal Free
Exercise Clause provided unconditional guarantees, which sweepingly
rejected any penalties or constraints on account of one’s religion.
On the other hand, American constitutions did not go so far as to guar-
antee a general right of exemption from nondiscriminatory laws.  In 1775,
the Quakers in Pennsylvania sought freedom not only from military service
but also from paying an equivalent for this service.38  They therefore argued
that they had a general religious liberty or exemption from equal laws.39  The
Revolutionaries, however, disagreed.  In the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution,
the Revolutionaries offered the Quakers an exemption from military service,
but not from paying an equivalent, let alone a general freedom from objec-
tionable laws.40  Indeed, the Revolutionaries condemned the Quaker idea of
a general right of exemption, protesting that it would be unequal and an
escape from duties that all citizens owed the society.41  Thus, in opposition to
the Quaker ideal of exemption, the Revolutionaries argued for the very dif-
ferent ideal of equality.
The Revolutionaries’ notion of religious liberty—a freedom under equal
laws, regardless of one’s religion—was a radical departure from the theory of
toleration, and it was the sort of religious liberty that, in one version or
another, was increasingly apt to make sense to the religiously diverse popula-
tion of the extended republic.42  Of course, a divergent minority, such as
Quakers, hoped for a broader freedom, a freedom even from equal laws.
The majority of minorities, however, sought a more moderate freedom—a
freedom under equal laws or, put another way, a freedom from penalty.
Such a freedom was generous in the context of mere toleration, but was lim-
ited as compared to demands for a general right of exemption.43
Text.  This moderate position—rejecting penalties but not embracing
exemption—was the freedom secured by the Free Exercise Clause.  The his-
GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 1772.  Similarly, an advocate for the Baptists observed: “The act of tolera-
tion gives liberty to all who properly apply for it, and are ready to perform the conditions.”
A Catholic Christian, Letter to Mrs. Rind, THE VIRGINIA GAZETTE, May 12, 1774.
38 Hamburger, Religious Freedom, supra note 2, at 1612.
39 Id. at 1605.
40 Id. at 1625.
41 Id. at 1615–21.
42 Many Americans endorsed only qualified versions of this ideal of religious liberty—
for example, by limiting it to monotheists, Christians, or even merely Protestants.  In one
version or another, however, the ideal of freedom under law, regardless of one’s religion,
had broad appeal in America.
43 It is common for scholars to generalize that the “peace churches” sought a constitu-
tional right of exemption, the suggestion being that there was a common front among
Quakers, Mennonites, and other sects.  The reality, however, was more complicated.  The
Mennonites, for example, did not fully join the Quakers in 1775, for the Mennonites were
of Germanic origin, and many of them were more content than the Quakers to see their
fellow Americans resist the English Crown.  Indeed, although Mennonites generally would
not serve in the military, a significant number were willing to pay an equivalent.
Hamburger, Religious Freedom, supra note 2, at 1621–22.
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tory need not be pursued in greater depth here, for the text should be
enough to illustrate the point.
The First Amendment guarantees that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,” and this is significant.44  The First Amendment does not suppose
that Congress can make laws that, in some applications, prohibit the free
exercise of religion but that otherwise are constitutional.  Instead, it more
sweepingly assumes that if a law in any way prohibits the free exercise of
religion, Congress cannot make it in the first place.  There consequently is
no room both for Congress to make a law and for the courts to carve out
exemptions on the theory that the law prohibits the free exercise of religion.
If the law in any way prohibits the free exercise of religion, even if only in a
single application, then (according to the First Amendment) there is no
authority in Congress to make the law.  The text itself thereby clearly pre-
cludes any constitutional claim of exemption.
Considered institutionally, the First Amendment imposes a duty on Con-
gress rather than the courts.  Congress is the body with the substantive consti-
tutional duty not to make a law that prohibits the free exercise of religion,
and the judges, on account of their own duty as judges, must hold unlawful
and void any act of Congress that violates that body’s constitutional duty.45
Therefore, when courts conclude that a law prohibits the free exercise of
religion, they should not uphold the law and carve out exemptions, but
rather should hold that Congress lacked the authority to make it.  Again, the
text clearly shows that the Free Exercise Clause does not grant a constitu-
tional right of exemption.46
Smith.  Although Smith did not rest on this analysis of the history and
text, the case largely recognized that the Free Exercise Clause guarantees
freedom under equal laws—a freedom from penalty—not a right of exemp-
tion.  For several decades after World War II, the Supreme Court interpreted
the Free Exercise Clause to provide a constitutional right of religious exemp-
tion from general laws.  Cases such as Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder
allowed Americans (at least members of Protestant sects) to escape general
laws that burdened their religious beliefs—at least up to the point that a
44 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
45 For the duty of the judges, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 283
(2008).
46 There obviously is much more that could be said about the choice between a free-
dom under equal laws, regardless of one’s religion, and a freedom from equal laws, on
account of one’s religion.  For example, as observed elsewhere, the freedom from law had
much appeal in the hierarchical context of eighteenth-century Britain, but much less in
the diverse and egalitarian context of late eighteenth-century America.  Hamburger, Relig-
ious Freedom, supra note 2, at 1630–31.  Moreover, although exemption has been described
as “accommodation,” there obviously is a need for accommodation in both directions—not
only by government but also by religion—and one of the virtues of constitutional guaran-
tees of freedom under equal laws is that they create pressures for both sorts of
accommodation.
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court found a compelling government interest.47  In 1990, however, Smith
cut short this line of exemption cases and largely, if not systematically,
restored the Free Exercise Clause to a freedom under equal laws.48
The Free Exercise Clause, from this point of view, provides freedom
under equal laws, regardless of one’s religion.  This is generous against the
historical background of penalties—unequal constraints on account of one’s
religion—but it is less than a right of religious exemption, a freedom from
equal laws on account of one’s religion.  And this limitation is what matters
here.  Being limited to a freedom from penalty—a freedom under equal
laws—the free exercise of religion leaves the question of exemption to the
political process.
B. The Political Logic of the Free Exercise Clause and Smith
The logic of the Free Exercise Clause rests on assumptions about access
to the political process.  There are many different understandings of relig-
ious liberty, and as has been seen, the free exercise of religion is neither the
narrowest nor the broadest.  Although in some circumstances the limited
character of the right can be worrisome, it is less worrisome when Americans
equally have access to the political process and thereby have at least a chance
to secure legislative relief where the courts cannot help.  Where religious
Americans are excluded from the political process, however, the political
logic of the Free Exercise Clause breaks down.
The Clause’s guarantee of freedom under equal laws, without regard to
one’s religion, is appealing against the threat of unequal laws.  But it offers
little reassurance for minorities whose beliefs are in conflict with equal laws,
and this is why political recourse is so important.  Although the judicial pro-
cess based on the Free Exercise Clause protects against unequal laws, the
representative political process based on freedom of speech is necessary as a
supplementary protection against overbearing equal laws.
In interpreting free exercise as a freedom under equal laws, Smith recog-
nized the importance of the political context.  In particular, the opinion of
the Court, written by Justice Scalia, acknowledged that, because the constitu-
tional protection is limited to a freedom under “neutral” or equal laws, Amer-
icans often need recourse to the political process to get statutory protection
47 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235–36 (1972) (exempting Amish from a state
education requirement beyond the eighth grade); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403,
406–07 (1963) (exempting a Seventh Day Adventist from a state eligibility requirement for
unemployment that she be willing to work on Saturdays).
48 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  Of course, one may wonder whether the
Supreme Court went beyond the freedom-under-equal-laws standard when it recognized a
free exercise right of churches to choose their ministers and thus a ministerial exception
from antidiscrimination laws.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).  The case, however, can be more modestly understood
as barring government from dictating a church’s choice of its clergy, in violation of the
Establishment Clause.
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for a broader freedom—a freedom from equal laws.49  At the very close of his
opinion, Justice Scalia explained:
 Values that are protected against government interference through
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the politi-
cal process.  Just as a society that believes in the negative protection
accorded to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that
affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society
that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be
expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.  It is therefore
not surprising that a number of States have made an exception to their drug
laws for sacramental peyote use.50
Although the Constitution does not protect a religious freedom from equal
laws, statutes may yet do so.
Of course, the case did not say that its denial of judicial redress was pred-
icated on the availability of political relief.  Nonetheless, the logic of the free-
dom under equal laws, and of Smith, rests on the coexistence of the two
avenues for protecting religious liberty.  The courts protect a limited consti-
tutional liberty from unequal constraints, and the legislatures can add more
expansive statutory rights from equal constraints.  Precisely because religious
exemption is available in the political process, it is not unreasonable for the
Free Exercise Clause to protect against only general laws in the judicial
process.
This logic, however, breaks down when Americans are systematically
barred from political participation.  Where administrative regulations are
adopted in circumstances that leave Americans unable to elect their adminis-
trative lawmakers, and where religious Americans are restricted in their
capacity to organize politically through their churches to protect their relig-
ious interests, they cannot find much consolation in the political logic of the
Free Exercise Clause and Smith.
This is not to say that the conception of free exercise evident in the
history, in the text, and in Smith is wrong.  But the equality (or no penalty)
conception of free exercise assumes a political avenue for redress that, in
fact, has been seriously truncated.  Superficially, religious Americans enjoy
the Free Exercise Clause’s freedom under equal laws, but without the full
political participation that would allow them to protect their interests under
such laws.  The exclusion thus makes the equality look hollow.
III. EXCLUSION THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE LAWMAKING
One element of the exclusion is administrative.  The courts assume that
they have protected equal participation in the political process by securing
an equal right to vote.  At the same time, however, administrative lawmaking
largely escapes the political process, thus excluding Americans from the sort
of participation they enjoy in the lawmaking process established by the Con-
49 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879–81.
50 Id. at 890.
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stitution.  Although this exclusion is general, it cuts with a distinctively sharp
edge against religious Americans.  The resulting exclusion leaves Americans
subject to the religious burdens of administrative lawmaking, but without the
political avenue for relief assumed in the First Amendment and Smith.
A. Exclusion
The administrative exclusion of the people from the lawmaking process
is familiar—perhaps so familiar that judges simply take it for granted.  For
Americans who are excluded, however, the results can be oppressive.
When Congress adopts a statute, the legislators tend to be careful of the
needs of their constituents and other Americans.  They consult with them;
they seek not only their votes but also their money; above all they try to avoid
antagonizing them.  Americans in turn attempt to impose their will on their
legislators.  They campaign for or against them.  They give money to them or
their opponents.  They also lobby them, in person and by other means.  (The
verb “lobby” arises from the ability of the people to meet their legislators in
the lobby of the House of Commons, and it thus centrally includes the ability
to cajole legislators in person.)51  Through such mechanisms, Americans
actively participate in the political process that ends up with congressional
legislation.
In contrast, when an administrative agency engages in binding lawmak-
ing—whether by adopting rules, interpretations, guidance, or even adjudica-
tion—the lawmaking usually evades public participation.  Americans can vote
for or against members of Congress, but not for or against administrators.
They can campaign for or against the one sort of lawmaker, but not for or
against the other.  They can give money for or against congressional cam-
paigns, but there is no equivalent in the administrative sphere.  They can
petition or otherwise lobby members of Congress, but most Americans have
no hope of even identifying most administrative lawmakers, let alone meet-
ing or speaking with them.
Accentuating this exclusion’s cost for religious Americans is the ten-
dency of administrators to idealize bureaucratic rationality and scientific
knowledge.  It is doubtful whether their rulemaking is merely rational or
really very scientific, and it is open to question whether rationality and sci-
ence are really at odds with religious belief.52  But the administrative idealiza-
51 A DICTIONARY OF AMERICANISMS: ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 985 (Mitford M.
Mathews ed., 1951).
52 Much of modern science and scientific thought comes out of medieval Christian
expectations that the world was created along lines of divine rationality and that it thus is
subject to a divinely established natural law.  There have since been new understandings of
nature, but the expectation that the world can be understood in terms of laws became the
foundation of modern scientific inquiry.  For a summary of the contrary thesis, that mod-
ern empirical science evolved out of medieval voluntarism, and for the failures of this
thesis, see Peter Harrison, Voluntarism and Early Modern Science, 40 HIST. SCI. 63 (2002).
Especially since the Enlightenment, proponents of human rationality have urged that
religion is inherently in conflict with rationality and science.  At the same time, many
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tion of scientism and centralized rationality usually renders administrative
acts—compared with acts of Congress—relatively indifferent and even antag-
onistic to religion and religious concerns.  Of course, this is not to say that
religious ideas ought to guide lawmaking; that is a complicated question that
goes far beyond the scope of this inquiry.  Instead, the point here is simply
that congressional lawmaking is open to the concerns of religious Americans
in ways that administrative rulemaking is not.
How, then, can religious Americans protect themselves from the bur-
dens of administrative “law”?  The Administrative Procedure Act assures them
that they will get a month’s “notice” and an opportunity to “comment.”53
But that is all.  This participation consists merely of being able to write (not
speak) to the rulemakers.54  It thus is less than the right to petition; it even is
less than the ordinary freedom of speech that Americans enjoy with their
neighbors; and it is a far cry from the right of Americans to vote for or
against their lawmakers.  The result is to leave administrators almost entirely
insulated from the public.  It therefore is laughable to suggest that notice
and comment is a substitute for elections, campaigns, petitioning, lobbying,
and other speech.  As put by David Baron and Elena Kagan, the notice-and-
comment process is “a charade.”55
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is even more of a charade than it
appears to be, because it does not even apply to much administrative lawmak-
ing.  Entire categories of lawmaking—such as the interpretation done
through guidance, manuals, letter opinions, briefs, etc.—does not really
require notice, let alone comment.56  As long as such interpretation appears
somewhere, however obscure, and is within the apparent statutory authority
of the agency, it is likely to be carried out by the courts.  Thus, even if notice
and comment could substitute for representation, it would justify only a small
part of administrative lawmaking.
Not being able to vote or campaign for or against administrative
lawmakers, not being able to petition them, not being able even to know who
others, including many scientists, have more cautiously tended to acknowledge the limits
of human rationality and of the scientific method.  There thus are multiple visions of
rationality and science, and for purposes of this Article, none of them can be taken for
granted.
As it happens, many administrators are religious in one way or another.  But the more
significant their role in shaping regulations, the more probable it is that they are not relig-
ious or that they are theologically liberal in their views.  Thus, even their religious beliefs
probably leave them relatively unsympathetic to the sort of religious beliefs that are most
seriously affected by the exclusion.
53 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 591(2) (2012).
54 Id. § 553.
55 David J. Baron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV.
201, 231.
56 Although notice and comment often is necessary for Chevron “deference,” it is
unnecessary for Skidmore “respect.”  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944).
Another example of lawmaking without notice is that done through waivers, which can be
issued without notice to anyone but the recipient of the waiver letter.
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most of them are, or what they are doing, Americans cannot participate in
the administrative process to protect their religious beliefs.  Unlike the politi-
cal process, this is nearly a closed process.
Americans do not even know when rules are coming down the pipeline,
and they therefore have little chance to resist.  At best, they are given thirty
days’ notice to object.  Just how much this cuts off opportunities to protect
against oppressive general laws is apparent from the ACA.  It did not mention
the contraception mandate disputed in Hobby Lobby; nor did it provide for
the unduly narrow exemptions from the mandate; instead, all of this came as
a surprise in the regulations introduced under the ACA.57  As a result, there
was little of the popular political process that could be expected when
lawmakers are elected, when they must face reelection, when Americans can
campaign for or against them, and when they can continually petition them,
warn them, and bargain with them.58
And because Americans do not elect administrative lawmakers, they can-
not easily press them to legislate in ways that are sensitive to the needs and
beliefs of religious minorities.  In Congress, legislators propose legislation in
response to a wide range of desires and needs felt by a wide range of Ameri-
cans.  In administrative offices, law comes at the behest of the executive, typi-
cally more in response to its policy than the varied demands of a diverse
people.  Indeed, the only legislation considered in the administrative world is
that which is acceptable to the executive—that which the executive hopes to
impose on the people.
Of course, individuals can submit comments to agencies, and large cor-
porations and well-heeled interest groups have much access to administra-
tors, and on both grounds many scholars therefore emphasize the
“democratic” character of administrative lawmaking.  Some even suggest that
57 The statute requires “applicable large employer[s]”—that is, employers with 50 or
more employers—to offer “minimum essential coverage.”  26 U.S.C. §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2)
(2012).  The regulations allow the Health Resources and Services Administration to “estab-
lish exemptions from such guidelines with respect to group health plans established or
maintained by religious employers and health insurance coverage provided in connection
with group health plans established or maintained by religious employers with respect to
any requirement to cover contraceptive services under such guidelines.”  45 C.F.R.
§ 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(A) (2013).  At first, the exemptions were for “religious employers,”
essentially churches and religious orders, and then were extended to some religious non-
profit organizations. Id. § 147.131(a)–(c); see Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128
HARV. L. REV. 154, 161 (2014) (citing U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Office of the
Gen. Counsel, Comment Letter Re: Interim Final Rules on Preventative Services 1 (Aug.
31, 2011), http://www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/rulemaking/upload/comments-
to-hhs-on-preventive-services-2011-08.pdf).
58 For the “pushback” against the narrow exemptions, which was a far cry from the
regular political process, see MARK HALPERIN & JOHN HEILEMANN, DOUBLE DOWN: GAME
CHANGE 2012, at 66–70 (2013); Horwitz, supra note 57, at 161; Byron Tau & Donovan
Slack, Biden: We ‘Screwed Up’ Contraception Mandate, POLITICO (Mar. 1, 2012; 4:18 PM),
http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/03/biden-we-screwed-up-contraception-debate-
116128.html.
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all of this amounts to participatory democracy.59  It even is claimed that an
administrative agency is often a more meaningful site for public participation
than Congress.60  And perhaps this is true at a high altitude—for the wealthi-
est of corporations and interest groups—but not on the ground, where most
Americans live.  For most of them, there is no participation.  None at all.
Administrative rules come from above, not below, and the suggestions to the
contrary about “participatory democracy” are not reassuring.  For most Amer-
icans, including most religious Americans, the administrative lawmaking pro-
cess is a closed world, and this has severe and constitutionally significant
consequences for religious Americans.
In short, administrative power excludes all Americans, but just because it
does not narrowly target religious Americans, does not mean it is without
interesting religious effects.  While administrators pursue lawmaking along
lines of scientism and centralized rationality, and while they are unaccounta-
ble in elections, religious Americans cannot adequately temper the religious
burdens of administrative rules.
Thus, although administrative power excludes the full range of Ameri-
cans, what matters for the free exercise of religion is that administrative
power excludes religious Americans and thereby eviscerates the equality pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause.
B. Congressional and Presidential Oversight
In defense of the exclusion of the people from control over their admin-
istrative lawmakers, it often is said that there is congressional and presidential
oversight.  From this point of view, there is no loss in the political process,
because an elected Congress and President have the power to overrule the
administrative lawmakers.
Certainly, Congress still has power over agencies.  As sardonically put by
Walter Gellhorn, “so long as the representative legislature remains
supreme—so long as it can modify or repeal rules the executive has made . . .
the danger of tyranny is not overwhelming.”61  The question, however, is not
a hard tyranny, but what Alexis de Tocqueville called a soft tyranny, in which
59 See, e.g., Jack Carver, Increasing Participation in E-Rulemaking Through “E-Voting,”
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. LAW (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.mjeal-online.org/increasing-
participation-in-e-rulemaking-through-”e-voting”/ (regarding “an attempt by the Federal
Government to bring a greater degree of participatory democracy to . . . Federal Agency
rulemaking”).
The term “democratic” is a misnomer, for the United States is a republic.  Indeed, it is
a compound republic, which uses a complex system of representation to “refine and
enlarge” the views of the public. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 62, (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
60 PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 256
(2000).
61 WALTER GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 15 (1941).
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the public is excluded from electing their lawmakers.62  Through this exclu-
sion, unelected executive officers can impose rules on the public without fear
of the next election, and they thereby are apt to make general rules that bear
down hard on some religious minorities.
Exactly how congressional oversight fails to protect against this danger
becomes evident when one considers the reversed roles of Congress and the
executive.  Under the Constitution, Congress makes laws and the President
can veto them.63  Now, in contrast, unelected administrators make rules, and
the rules remain in effect unless Congress passes a statute barring them.
Religiously burdensome “laws” thus can come into existence from unelected
and largely anonymous administrators, and congressional action (which
responds to political participation) is reduced to a blocking action.
For example, after HHS adopted its regulations imposing the contracep-
tion mandate, a senator who was concerned about religious liberty proposed
a bill to expand the exemptions.  The regulations merely allowed administra-
tors to grant exemptions to religious organizations; in contrast, the bill would
have allowed all employers to opt out on religious or moral grounds.64  The
bill, however, was defeated in the Senate by a vote of fifty-one to forty-eight,
and this close margin is revealing.  The Senate probably would not have been
able to adopt the contraception mandate without an exemption for religious
employers, but after unelected administrators imposed the mandate without
such an exemption, the question changed.  Rather than be about imposing
contraception on religious employers, the question now was about denying
contraception to their employees, and the Senate therefore lacked the votes
to respond.
The reversal of the legislative roles of Congress and the executive thus
profoundly reduces the responsiveness of the “law” to religious Americans.
Congress is far more sensitive to religious sensibilities than administrators.
Accordingly, for purposes of religious liberty, a congressional veto on execu-
tive lawmaking is no substitute for the Constitution’s requirement of congres-
sional legislation, subject to an executive veto.
Another version of the oversight justification is that administrators are
accountable to higher administrators.  According to Jerry Mashaw,
“[i]nternal managerial controls can protect private rights and promote fidel-
ity to legislative purposes.”65  But this is simply to say that it is turtles all the
way up.66
62 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 316–19 (Phillips Bradley, ed.,
Henry Reeve, trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1835).
63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
64 Matt Negrin, Senate Blocks Blunt’s Repeal of Contraception Mandate, ABC NEWS (Mar. 1,
2012, 12:00 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/contraception-man-
date-goes-up-for-a-vote/.
65 JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 9 (2012).
66 Hegel already argued that administrative officials would not act contrary to public
interest—in part because they were accountable to higher officials in the administrative
hierarchy.  Upon reading this, Karl Marx protested:
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To be sure, many administrators are under the supervision of the Presi-
dent, but although the President is elected, he is not a representative body.
The election of a hundred senators and hundreds of representatives from
fifty states ensures that at least some of the nation’s diversity, including some
of its religious diversity, will be represented in the debates over the adoption
of laws.  The election of a single President, in contrast, does not ensure that
he will give voice to the nation’s diversity in making regulations.  Nor does
his election ensure that unelected and almost unknown administrators will
give voice to the diverse concerns of a diverse people.  Whereas minorities
can hope to find a voice in Congress through one lawmaker or another, they
cannot realistically hope for this from unelected administrators, who are
overseen by a President chosen by the nation as whole in a winner-take-all
election.
The idea that congressional or presidential oversight will secure the
religious interests that Americans ordinarily would protect by electing their
lawmakers is especially unrealistic because most administrative lawmakers are
not very accountable to their superiors, except for gross departures from
duty.  Indeed, many administrators make binding regulations in more or less
“independent” agencies, with varying degrees of formal independence from
political control.
The congressional and presidential oversight arguments are particularly
cold comfort for religious Americans who pursue their religious interests
through their churches.  Most Americans can at least campaign for and
against their elected officials, and thereby can participate in shaping the con-
duct of those who, very, very distantly, oversee their administrative
lawmakers.  It is very different, however, for religious Americans whose ortho-
dox understanding of religious authority or whose relatively unpopular
beliefs render them dependent on their churches for pursuing their religious
interests in politics.  These Americans must work through their churches to
protect their religious freedom, but because of § 501(c)(3), as will be seen in
Part IV, churches no longer enjoy their First Amendment right to campaign
or to devote themselves to petitioning.  Such Americans thus do not even
have the assurance of participating equally in choosing those who merely
oversee the administrative lawmakers.  The administrative exclusion is thus
reinforced by § 501(c)(3)’s exclusion, and once again, there are distinctively
harsh consequences for religious Americans.
The oversight, in sum, is mostly an illusion, and for Americans who rely
on their churches in politics, the oversight is twice as illusory.  The oversight
does not protect religious Americans from the effects of the administrative
[I]f we ask Hegel what is civil society’s protection against the bureaucracy, he
answers: . . . The hierarchal organization of the bureaucracy.  Control.  This, that
the adversary is himself bound hand and foot, and if he is like a hammer vis-a`-vis
those below he is like an anvil in relation to those above.  Now, where is the
protection against the hierarchy?
KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF HEGEL’S ‘PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT’ 53 (Joseph O’Malley ed., Annette
Jolin & Joseph O’Malley trans. 1970) (emphasis omitted).
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exclusion, and when Americans rely on their churches in politics, they can-
not even fully participate in the process of choosing those who do the over-
sight—thus rendering these Americans doubly isolated from administrative
lawmakers.
C. Other Justifications for Administrative Power
In addition to oversight, there are a host of other alleged justifications
for administrative power.  These include congressional delegation, adminis-
trative expertise, the necessities of governing a modern industrial economy,
and so forth.  Such justifications are addressed in detail elsewhere.67  The
argument here, however, is not about the constitutionality of administrative
power, but about the exclusion of Americans from the political process that
shapes administrative lawmaking, and the alleged justifications of administra-
tive power, even if persuasive, cannot disguise this reality.
In fact, the justifications for administrative rulemaking tend to acknowl-
edge that Americans are excluded from the rulemaking process.68  The dele-
gation of administrative lawmaking is all about shifting lawmaking out of the
political process and into the hands of persons insulated from it.  The exper-
tise justification claims that some decisions are so technical, they can be
made only by expert administrators, not legislators.69  The necessity justifica-
tion contends that lawmaking by administrators is necessary in a modern
society because the political process in Congress is too slow and too respon-
sive to political concerns.70  Such justifications do not deny the administra-
tive exclusion of the American people, but recognize and excuse it.
It always will be possible to come up with justifications for excluding
Americans from the political process.  In the early nineteenth century there
were plenty of seemingly impregnable justifications for removing voting
rights from blacks, women, and unpropertied white males, but there was no
doubt about the exclusion, and it eventually came to recognized as wrong.
Similarly, nowadays, there are many apparently solid justifications for remov-
ing legislative power from the legislative body elected by Americans, but all
the justifications in the world do not alter the reality of the exclusion, which
is basis of this Article.  Indeed, the justifications of administrative power tend
to acknowledge that it takes lawmaking power out of the hands of elected
representatives and thus largely out of the reach of popular participation in
the political process.71
Accordingly, even if the removal of lawmaking from the people’s repre-
sentatives were justifiable, it would not change the reality of exclusion.
Regardless of whether or not one likes administrative power, it excludes
Americans from voting for their administrative lawmakers.  It thus subjects
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Americans to binding rules, interpretations, etc.—to “law”—in which they
have severely diminished opportunities for participation in the political pro-
cess that creates the law.
D. Deliberate
The exclusion of Americans from political participation in administra-
tive lawmaking is deliberate.  Rather than a side effect, the exclusion has
always been an essential point of administrative power.
Already in the pre-American administrative systems that flourished on
the Continent, one of the goals of having centralized administrative rule was
to place lawmaking power beyond the control of importunate interests within
society by establishing a form of governance that was, instead, accountable to
the State.  This perspective eventually found philosophic expression when
Hegel described the bureaucracy as a “universal” class, which would serve the
State in protecting the public’s “objective” interest, in opposition to the pri-
vate “subjective” interests of the society—as if the diverse interests of the peo-
ple had to be made accountable to the State, rather than vice versa.72
Similarly, when late nineteenth-century Americans, mostly progressives,
pressed for administrative power in the United States, they sought to estab-
lish administrators who would pursue the public interest, without too much
accountability to the legislature or thereby to the public.  Again, the goal was
to secure public ends by insulating administrators from the public and even
from their representatives.
Put another way, the goal of administrative power was to escape repre-
sentative accountability and the underlying political process.  Woodrow Wil-
son, for example, unctuously explained to Americans “the error of trying to
do too much by vote.”73  Although administrative power could not elude the
broad sweep of public opinion, Wilson and his fellow progressives aimed to
limit public opinion—to “make public opinion efficient without suffering it
to be meddlesome.”74  The key was to confine “public criticism” to “formative
policy” and to exclude it from administrative details:  “Let administrative
study find the best means for giving public criticism this control and for shut-
ting it out from all other interference.”75  Frank Goodnow observed that the
goal was to escape politics—what he called “party tyranny”—and he therefore
sought to prevent the “undue extension of the control of politics over admin-
istration.”76  Just as judges were independent, so administrators and their
72 GEORG W. F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 143 (William Wallace trans., 2008)
(1894).
73 Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 214 (1887).
74 Id. at 215.
75 Id.
76 FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 13 (1905).
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power were to be “independent.”77  Even to this day, it is said that administra-
tors are “largely insulated from politics.”78
Tellingly, administrative regulation repeatedly was expanded after each
extension of the right to vote.  Whenever the right of suffrage was
extended—in 1870, 1920, and 1965—it was followed by an expansion of
administrative power, thus taking away in lawmaking what had been con-
ceded in voting rights.  In each iteration, administrative power evaded differ-
ent combinations of the American populace, but the repeated theme was to
escape popular power.
Again, Wilson was refreshingly candid.  Already at the beginnings of fed-
eral administrative power, he spelled out the progressive need for this mode
of governance, writing that “the reformer is bewildered” by the need to per-
suade “a voting majority of several million heads.”79  The difficulty lay in
influencing “the mind, not of Americans of the older stocks only, but also of
Irishmen, of Germans, [and] of negroes.”80
Of course, he might just as well have said, “Catholics, Germans, and
negroes.”  The progressive interest in administrative power developed largely
in revulsion against the political power exercised by so many Irish Catholics
and other religious, ethnic, and racial groups.  The educated Americans
whose identity and status centered on their “scientific” or rational knowledge
were often horrified by the tumultuous politics of the unwashed, their nar-
rowly local and parochial attachments, and their unfortunate religious objec-
tions to progressive causes, and from this perspective, many progressives
concluded that it was necessary to shift legislative power from elected legisla-
tures to rational administrators—to persons like themselves.81  It thus is no
coincidence that administrative power cuts popular religious feelings out of
the lawmaking process; that was part of the larger point.82
Scholars still observe how administrative power “can remove the neces-
sity of building a public consensus in favor of reform.”83  And unsurprisingly,
many administrators want to go even further in taking advantage of this.
Peter Orszag—a former White House Budget Director—explains “[w]hy we
77 Id.
78 Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 582 (1984).
79 Wilson, supra note 73, at 208.
80 Id. at 209.
81 For aspects of this, see HAMBURGER, supra note 67, at 371, 454–55.
82 Of course, progressives embraced apparently conflicting tendencies.  On the one
hand, they endorsed equal suffrage and even sought popular referenda; on the other, they
removed legislative power from legislatures.  This is not, however, as puzzling as it may
seem, for in identifying with scientific or rational knowledge, they rejected the hierarchies
and power of local representative government, and they attacked this simultaneously from
below and above—with populism from below and with centralized administrative power
from above.  Popular power thus was central, but it was not to be trusted with the power
reserved for administrators and the “broader knowledge” class. See id. at 370–74.
83 DENNIS J. MAHONEY, POLITICS AND PROGRESS: THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN POLITI-
CAL SCIENCE 136 (2004).
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need less democracy.”84  Not content with existing administrative power, he
argues that “[w]e need to minimize the harm from legislative inertia by rely-
ing more on automatic policies and depoliticized commissions for certain
policy decisions.  In other words, radical as it sounds, we need to counter the
gridlock of our political institutions by making them a bit less democratic.”85
Of course, “gridlock” here is a euphemism for a failure to persuade elected
lawmakers, this being what necessitates becoming “less democratic.”86  Simi-
larly, Steve Rattner—former auto czar—writes: “Either Congress needs to get
its act together or we should explore alternatives. . . . If our country wants to
do a better job of solving its problems, it needs to find a way to let talented
government officials operate more like they do in the private sector.”87  Per-
haps this mode of governance would be more efficient—and perhaps not—
but certainly it allows lawmaking to proceed in a way that minimizes the role
of elected representatives and thereby also the people.
The free exercise implications are sobering.  For statutes, it makes sense
to have a constitutional right of freedom under equal laws, regardless of
one’s religion, for the people can participate in the political process to
choose their lawmakers, and they thereby can do much to protect themselves
from the equal laws that grate against their religious beliefs.  For administra-
tive power, however, there is no equivalent participation in the process of
choosing and removing the lawmakers.  Administrative power imposes bur-
dens without the constitutionally authorized opportunities for political par-
ticipation, and it thereby leaves many religious Americans at risk.
IV. EXCLUSION THROUGH § 501(C)(3)
A second aspect of the exclusion of religious Americans from political
participation in lawmaking focuses directly on religious Americans.  Whereas
most Americans and their organizations at least can campaign for and against
legislators, and can devote themselves to petitioning for and against legisla-
tion, religious and other idealistic organizations cannot do such things with-
out being taxed under § 501(c)(3).88  As a result, religious organizations are
substantially excluded from essential aspects of the political process, and this
means that law—not only administrative edicts but also statutes—are apt to
bear down hard on religious Americans.
A. Exclusion
Section 501(c)(3) constrains a range of organizations—most notably,
religious, educational, and charitable organizations—from campaigning and
84 Obama-Style Democracy: Bureaucrats Know Best, WASH. EXAM’R (Sept. 28, 2011, 7:05
PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/obama-style-democracy-bureaucrats-know-best/
article/118794 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
86 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
87 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
88 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL505.txt unknown Seq: 31 20-JUL-15 11:50
2015] exclusion  and  equality 1949
from devoting themselves substantially to petitioning.  It thereby largely
excludes the nation’s idealistic organizations from participating (that is, from
fully and equally participating) in basic types of political participation.
Indeed, it singles out religious organizations for this exclusion.
At first glance, § 501(c)(3) is merely one of the parts of § 501 that iden-
tify organizations exempt from taxation.  As a preliminary matter, subsection
(a) provides that “[a]n organization described in subsection (c) . . . shall be
exempt from taxation under this subtitle”—thus generally exempting some
as yet undefined organizations from the income tax.89  Subsection (b) quali-
fies this exemption by taxing even the exempt organizations for their “unre-
lated business income.”90  Then, subsection (c) specifies the exempt
organizations.  Of particular importance, subsection (c)(3) exempts corpora-
tions and other organizations dedicated to certain purposes, including, most
centrally, those “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charita-
ble, . . . or educational purposes.”91
In exempting these organizations, however, § 501 also subjects them to
limitations, and again § 501(c)(3) is especially important.  It subjects the
nation’s primary idealistic organizations—religious, educational, and charita-
ble organizations—to restrictions on both petitioning and campaigning.
First, a religious, educational, or charitable organization is exempt only
if it is one “no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propa-
ganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.”92  Second, it is
exempt only if it “does not participate in, or intervene in (including the pub-
lishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or
in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”93  The exemption for
churches, schools, and charities thus comes with a severe restriction on peti-
tioning and a complete restriction on campaigning—a restriction that
89 Id. § 501(a).
90 Id. § 501(b).
91 Id. § 501(c)(3).  The section in its entirety states:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as oth-
erwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or inter-
vene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.  The restrictions in § 501(c)(3) are subject to a host of complex interpretations
and exceptions, which need not be pursued here.
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expressly emphasizes its bar on “publishing” and “distributing” statements.94
And this in the United States!
Already at this point it should be apparent that § 501(c)(3) does not
simply confine “nonprofits.”  This anodyne label may suffice for calculating
taxes, but not for evaluating the constitutional questions.  More to the point
constitutionally, § 501(c)(3) targets idealistic organizations for restrictions on
their freedom of speech and petitioning.  Nonprofits—especially religious,
educational, and charitable organizations—are devoted to pursuing ideals, in
contrast to profit or other selfish interests.  Section 501(c)(3) thus generally
targets idealistic organizations, in contrast to business, labor, and other orga-
nizations representing types of self-interest.
The idealistic organizations that matter here are religious.  In singling
out religious organizations for restrictions on their petitioning and political
speech, § 501(c)(3) limits the ability of many religious Americans to bring
their religious concerns into politics.  The section excludes churches from
the political process and it thereby also excludes Americans who rely on their
churches to protect their religious interests in the political realm.95
Of course, notwithstanding § 501(c)(3), many churches and other ideal-
istic organizations do their best to participate in politics.  In a 2004 IRS study
of one hundred and ten § 501(c)(3) organizations, it became apparent that
68% had engaged in prohibited campaign activities.96  Most violations, how-
ever, were innocent.  For example, many violations were based on misunder-
standings of IRS interpretations or were anomalous or were promptly
corrected after they were pointed out.97  In other words, where the IRS inter-
pretations were clear to the organizations, they usually complied.98  The
study thus actually confirms the degree to which churches and other idealis-
tic organizations are constrained by § 501(c)(3).  To the extent the law is
clear, it largely keeps them from campaigning or substantially petitioning.
Both in law and in reality, § 501(c)(3) substantially excludes such organiza-
tions from central modes of political participation.
B. Justifications
Of course, there are considerations that may seem to justify
§ 501(c)(3)’s restrictions.  These considerations are familiar from the consti-
tutional debate over the section, and they cannot excuse the section’s viola-
94 Id.
95 See id.
96 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FINAL REPORT, PROJECT 302, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLI-
ANCE INITIATIVE (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/final_paci_report
.pdf; see Gina M. Lavarda, Nonprofits: Are You at Risk of Losing Your Tax-Exempt Status?, 94
IOWA L. REV. 1473, 1476–77 (2009).
97 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 96, at 1476–77.
98 See id.
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tions of the First Amendment.99  Yet even if they were persuasive on the
constitutional question, they cannot explain away the exclusion.
Merely Conditions on Spending.  A standard constitutional justification for
§ 501(c)(3)’s constraints is that they are merely conditions on spending.  The
conditions argument, however, does not show the constitutionality of the
speech and petitioning restrictions, and more to the point here, it does not
justify the exclusion.
99 For some of the scholarship justifying the restrictions in § 501(c)(3), see Roger
Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of Citizens United: A Defense of Prohibi-
tion, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685 (2012) (arguing that § 501(c)(3) is compatible with Citi-
zens United); Lavarda, supra note 96 (arguing that § 501(c)(3) grants a subsidy consistent
with free speech); Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate—Never the Twain
Shall Meet?, 1 PITT. TAX REV. 35 (2003) (arguing that § 501(c)(3) is justified by separation
of church and state and that its restrictions on speech are viewpoint neutral); Donald B.
Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for
Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313 (2007) (arguing that § 501(c)(3) grants a subsidy consistent
with free speech and free exercise, and that it protects democracy); Sarah Hawkins, Note,
From Branch Ministries to Selma: Why the Internal Revenue Service Should Strictly Enforce the
§ 501(c)(3) Prohibition against Church Electioneering, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (2008)
(arguing that § 501(c)(3) is required by the separation of church and state and to prevent
divisiveness) Eric R. Swibel, Comment, Churches and Campaign Intervention: Why the Tax Man
Is Right and How Congress Can Improve His Reputation, 57 EMORY L.J. 1605 (2008) (arguing
that § 501(c)(3) is consistent with free exercise and is required by the separation of church
and state).
For some of the scholarship questioning the lawfulness of § 501(c)(3)’s restrictions,
see Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax Law Controls
on Political Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L REV. 217 (1992) (regarding free speech and
vagueness); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., On Not Rendering to Caesar: The Unconstitutionality
of Tax Regulation of Activities of Religious Organizations Relating to Politics, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 1
(1990) (regarding free speech and free exercise); Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes
Collide: Will Citizens United and Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Cam-
paign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 915–28 (2011) (regarding over-
breadth and vagueness); Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the
Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771 (2001) (regarding free exercise); Oliver A.
Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral Politics by Charitable Organi-
zations under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2003) (regard-
ing motivations of legislators and overbreadth); Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits:
A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious Organizations,
42 B.C. L. REV. 875 (2001) (regarding free speech and free exercise); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer,
Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 1137, 1161–97 (2009) (regarding the violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act); Erik W. Stanley, LBJ, The IRS, and Churches: The Unconstitutionality of the Johnson Amend-
ment in Light of Recent Supreme Court Precedent, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 237 (2012) (regarding
free speech and free exercise); Zachary Cummings, Note, Prophetic Speech and the Internal
Revenue Code: Analyzing I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) in Light of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 20
REGENT U. L. REV. 151 (2007) (regarding violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act); Joseph S. Klapach, Note, Thou Shalt Not Politic: A Principled Approach to Section
501(c)(3)’s Prohibition of Political Campaign Activity, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 504 (1999) (regard-
ing free speech).
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As will be shown in detail elsewhere, § 501(c)(3)’s limits are grossly
unconstitutional.100  They sweepingly restrict speech and petitioning by relig-
ious and other idealistic organizations, regardless of the amount of the sup-
posed subsidy, and even when there is no subsidy.  They therefore are grossly
disproportionate and nongermane and thus are precisely the sort of condi-
tions that Supreme Court doctrine treats as unconstitutional.101  Accord-
ingly, notwithstanding that the Supreme Court has upheld § 501(c)(3)’s
restriction on petitioning, it is difficult to understand how its petitioning and
speech restrictions are really constitutional.102
Imagine that the government actually offered money to churches and
other idealistic organizations on account of their public service, but required
in exchange that they silence themselves in campaigns and substantially in
petitioning.  This clearly would be unconstitutional, but it at least would leave
churches free to speak without a direct penalty.  Section 501(c)(3), in con-
trast, is much worse, for it gives churches and other idealistic organizations a
choice between silence or paying a tax—indeed, a choice between silence or
paying a tax to which they otherwise have never been subject.103  It thus is a
tax or direct penalty on petitioning and campaign speech by religious and
other idealistic organizations.
If this is the offer of a contract, it is at best an extortionate offer—the
sort one cannot refuse.  Put simply, when the law tells religious and other
idealistic organizations, “shut up or pay a tax,” it cannot be constitutional.
Section 501(c)(3)’s restrictions on speech and petitioning are forcefully
unconstitutional—one of the most sweeping violations of the First Amend-
ment in American history.
The complaint here, however, is not that § 501(c)(3) is unconstitutional,
but rather that it excludes.  It severely limits petitioning and political speech
by churches and thereby also religious individuals.  The result predictably is
to limit their effectiveness in politics, with sobering consequences for their
ability to protect themselves from equal but religiously burdensome laws.
Even if (improbably) § 501(c)(3) were constitutional, it hollows out religious
equality, leaving in place the formal equality guaranteed by the Free Exercise
100 This argument will be made in a forthcoming book by the author.
101 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984); see also Rene´e Lettow
Lerner, Unconstitutional Conditions, Germaneness, and Institutional Review Boards, 101 NW. U.
L. REV. 775, 788–89 (2007) (showing need for tighter fit between purpose and conditions
for regulatory conditions, compared to purchases).
Where organizations have little income, the subsidizing effect can be only tiny.  And
the conditions restrict organizations even where they do not spend any substantial amount
of money on their speech.  For example, when preachers campaign from their pulpits,
when church members urge fellow citizens to vote in accord with religious dictates, or
when they petition their representatives in Congress, they usually use no money whatso-
ever.  For such reasons and others, it is difficult to conclude that § 501(c)(3)’s flat restric-
tions on petitioning and campaigning are germane and proportionate.
102 Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983) (upholding
§ 501(c)(3)’s restriction on petitioning).
103 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
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Clause, but depriving many religious Americans of their political ability to
secure their religious interests under equal laws.
This remains true, moreover, even if § 501(c)(3) merely imposes condi-
tions—indeed, even if it imposes entirely constitutional conditions.  The gov-
ernment increasingly controls Americans through conditions on its largess.
Although Charles Reich may have overstated the due process restrictions on
the government’s distribution of benefits, he aptly noted the degree to which
the government uses its grants to control Americans.104  Whereas govern-
ment traditionally ruled through law, it now governs at least as much through
spending.  And this is a reminder that, even if § 501(c)(3) merely places con-
ditions on spending, such conditions can be powerful mechanisms for limit-
ing the freedom of Americans—in this instance, by excluding religious
organizations, and thereby many religious Americans, from key aspects of the
political process.
Alternative Routes for Speech.  Of course, idealistic organizations still can
campaign and petition through adjunct § 501(c)(4) organizations.105  But
even these organizations apparently are subject to limits on campaigning and
petitioning.106  Thus, to enjoy free speech in politics, a church must form a
§ 501(c)(4) organization and then this organization then must form a § 527
political action committee, which in turn is finally is allowed to speak freely
in politics.107  The result is a series of Russian dolls: The largest is muted, the
smaller is slightly less muted, and only the tiniest is allowed freely to squeak
out a political message.
Idealistic organizations are thus restricted in their attempts to speak in
their own voice.  Churches, for example, have a right—a freedom derived
from God and protected by the Constitution—to speak as churches.108  Yet
rather than speak in their voice, they are forced to speak like ventriloquists;
they must keep their mouths closed and can, at best project a muffled sound
through a wooden dummy—a lifeless substitute for a living religious commu-
nity.  Churches therefore cannot speak in the same voice, even in the same
104 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 756, 787 (1964).
105 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4).
106 Section 501(c)(4) organizations are limited in their political speech, for the IRS
states that a § 501(c)(4) organization must avoid going so far as to be no longer “primarily
engag[ing] in activities that promote social welfare.”  Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.  At
least as to campaign speech, the IRS has hinted at the implications, but not with much
clarity: “Although the promotion of social welfare within the meaning of section
1.501(c)(4)-1 of the regulations does not include political campaign activities, the regula-
tions do not impose a complete ban on such activities for section 501(c)(4) organizations.”
Id.  For discussion of this point, see Houck, supra note 99, at 82; Klapach, supra note 99, at
510–11, 515.
107 26 C.F.R. § 1.527-6(f), (g) (2014); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (explaining that the political action committee is “free to participate in
political campaigns”).  See, in contrast, the approach taken in Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010).  For this structure, see Galston, supra note 99, at 905–06.
108 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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body, about both personal morality and political morality.  When speaking to
God or the people about moral questions, a church can speak in its own
voice, but when speaking to the people about elections, or to Congress about
legislation, it must speak through a contraption manufactured by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service.
In another version of the alternate-route-for-speech justification, it is
said that churches and other idealistic organizations can speak through their
members.  Thus, although a church cannot campaign or substantially peti-
tion, it can do so through its members.109  But this is to view church mem-
bers as theological automatons, who are subservient to the church’s
directives.  And in depriving a church of its freedom of political engagement,
this approach also deprives the members of their freedom to speak in unison
and thereby enjoy the strength of a united voice.  The voices of individual
members are thus no substitute for their united voice through their
organization.
A further variant of these justifications is that churches and other idealis-
tic organizations can speak through political parties.  Indeed, some religious
groups can ally themselves with political parties.  But what of the groups that
are too small, too orthodox in their attachment to church authority, or too
distant from politically popular views?  They often cannot work to protect
their beliefs through political parties and therefore need to work through
their own churches.  The alternative avenues for speech thus are no cure for
the exclusion of churches from the political process.
Avoiding a Conduit for Tax Deductible Political Contributions.  There is a seri-
ous danger that § 501(c)(3)’s tax exemption could create a conduit for tax-
deductible political contributions.  Taxpayers contributing money to
§ 501(c)(3) organizations can deduct the amount of their contributions from
their income, as permitted by Internal Revenue Code § 170(c)(2).110  Sec-
tion 501(c)(3)’s restrictions have therefore been justified as a necessary bar-
rier to the political use of deductible contributions.111
Certainly, there is a risk that tax-exempt churches and other idealistic
organizations, as listed in § 501(c)(3), will become conduits for tax-deducti-
ble political contributions.  But can worries about the abuse of tax deduc-
tions really justify shutting churches (and other idealistic organizations) out
of central political arenas?  The government created the deduction problem
and it thus is mere bootstrapping for it to claim that this problem justifies it
in barring idealistic organizations from petitioning and core political speech.
Indeed, § 501(c)(3)’s restrictions on exemption are disproportionate
and irrelevant to the deduction problem, first, because many churches and
other idealistic organizations have assets that were not derived from tax-
deductible sources.  Many, for example, have assets derived from their own
income or from an era before deductions became available, and their use of
109 See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 99, at 1351.
110 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2).
111 See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 99, at 1317.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL505.txt unknown Seq: 37 20-JUL-15 11:50
2015] exclusion  and  equality 1955
these assets has nothing to do with the danger from tax deductions.  Second,
where petitioning or political speech by idealistic organizations is nearly with-
out cost—as when a minister preachers in favor of a candidate—the speech
or petitioning does not have much connection to deductible contributions.
Third, and most seriously, if the underlying concern is about politically
targeted deductions by donors, it is utterly unnecessary and oppressive to deny
exemption to organizations for exercising their First Amendment rights.  This is
anything but proportionate or narrowly tailored for blocking tax-deductible
political contributions and it thereby can be explained only in terms of other,
less constitutional ends.
In fact, there are all sorts of less restrictive means of avoiding the danger
of tax deductible campaign contributions.  Rather than sweepingly bar
§ 501(c)(3) organizations from engaging in electoral politics, Congress could
simply deny deductibility for donations that end up being used in campaigns
or in any substantial petitioning.  The mechanics would not be difficult.  Basi-
cally, such a law would deny deductibility for a donor unless he could show
that his donation was not used or would not be used for the restricted end.
He could do this by producing an accounting or certification from the recipi-
ent organization about how the money was used or about its placement in a
restricted fund.  And where organizations could not provide such paperwork,
donors would not be able to deduct their donations from their income.
This would preclude political use of the subsidy conveyed through
deductions.  And by focusing on deductions for donors, it would avoid the
unconstitutional speech and petitioning restrictions imposed by threatening
the exemptions of organizations.
The government, however, has not addressed the narrow problem of
deductions with a solution that narrowly focuses on deductions.  On the con-
trary, it uses the narrow deduction problem to justify the broad exclusion of
churches and other idealistic associations from key political participation.
The government thereby grossly overplays its hand.  Its broad exclusions can-
not be justified by the much narrower concerns about the donor deductions,
and thus (once again) the alleged justification is a poor excuse for the exclu-
sion of churches from the political process.
Applied to Professors.  Of course, there is no end to the justifications for
excluding others from petitioning and political speech, and no attempt will
be made here to respond to all of the justifications.112  But one way of think-
ing about the justifications is to engage in a simple thought experiment: to
apply something like § 501(c)(3) to other speakers—for example, professors.
Professors are supposed to be devoted to academic pursuits, and one
could easily take a narrow view of academic ends to justify a federally
imposed separation of academia and politics.  Of course, professors would
remain free to espouse political views when not identified as professors.  But
112 Nonetheless, one other justification—the separation of church and state—will be
discussed. See infra Section V.C.
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when speaking in their academic role—whether in class, in scholarship, or
otherwise under any academic title—they would have to avoid any campaign-
ing or substantial petitioning.
This enforced separation of academia and politics would seem all the
more reasonable because almost all professors benefit, directly or indirectly,
from substantial federal spending on their students and universities.  From
this perspective, it would make sense to condition federal aid to students and
universities on their professors’ not engaging in campaigning or substantial
petitioning.
Put another way, if professors were really dedicated to their academic
role, they would not engage in political speech and participation.  And when
they pursued political speech in politics, this would be a sign that they were
not really devoted to academic ends.  Accordingly, when they thereby
stepped outside their specialized academic role, it would be only just for the
government to reconsider the eligibility of their institutions and students for
government aid.
Of course, the limits on speech and petitioning would easily be
defended on the ground that the restrictions would merely affect professors
who participated in politics in their own voice.  Although they would be pre-
cluded from political speech in their classes and scholarship, they still would
be able to speak through their students, who are susceptible to professorial
influence and thus might campaign or petition in pursuit of the professorial
message.
Such is the application of something like § 501(c)(3) to professors.
Readers can create their own, even more ludicrous illustrations.
The larger point is that the reasons for suppression are plentiful, but this
does not mean they are persuasive.  In constitutional debates, they do not
disguise the reality of suppression, and in this Article they do not displace the
reality of how § 501(c)(3)’s restrictions exclude religious Americans from the
political process.  Quite apart from the question of whether these restrictions
are constitutional, they cut back on political participation by idealistic organi-
zations, and thereby leave religious Americans and their organizations with a
diminished capacity to protect themselves from equal but religiously burden-
some laws.
C. Deliberate
Like the exclusion of Americans from administrative lawmaking,
§ 501(c)(3)’s exclusion of churches, schools, and charities from the political
process is not an accident.  It is a manifestation of widespread anxieties about
churches and other idealistic organizations—anxieties that are difficult to
distinguish from prejudice.113
113 It may be protested that the fear of the Catholic Church, or of other religious or
more broadly idealistic organizations, is not prejudice, but a justifiable concern about the
influence of organizations, particularly those claiming hierarchical authority over their
members, or those espousing ideals contrary to American ideals.  Undoubtedly, there are
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Of course, this is a serious accusation, and it will be elaborated with
detailed evidence in a forthcoming book.114  In the meantime, this Article
must summarize how § 501(c)(3)’s exclusion was deliberate.
Personal Responses.  Section 501(c)(3) acquired its constraints on peti-
tioning and speech when three senators responded to political opposition.
In all three instances, there is no reason to think that they were specifically
concerned about religious organizations.  Instead, they and their fellow
members of Congress were responding to a more general source of annoy-
ance: idealistic organizations, both religious and nonreligious, were asserting
their ideals in political debates.
Of course, there were earlier hints of the restrictions that the senators
introduced into § 501(c)(3).  The Treasury Department had interpreted its
regulations on educational organizations to limit these bodies from lobbying
through political “propaganda.”115  But the broader shift toward limiting the
speech and petitioning of idealistic organizations came from the three
senators.
In 1933, Senator David Reed attempted to pass legislation increasing vet-
erans’ benefits, but failed on account of opposition from the National Econ-
omy League.  Reed therefore led the effort in 1934 to adopt the initial
version of what became § 501(c)(3)’s restriction on petitioning.116  He evi-
dently aimed to ensure that nonprofits—at least, that is, the idealistic organi-
grounds for worrying about religious and idealistic organizations, but there is a long his-
tory of highly exaggerated and selective fears of this sort.
More generally, even when the fears are justified, it is unclear how they justify using
the law to deprive Americans and their organizations of their First Amendment rights.
The reasonableness of the fears cannot make the lawlessness reasonable.
114 The evidence here about the historical background of § 501(c)(3) is only part of
deeper range of evidence that will be published later in the book discussed supra note 100.
115 In 1917, the Code had allowed deductions for contributions to bodies organized
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.  War Revenue Act
of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).  Eventually, in 1919,
the IRS issued regulations defining educational organizations, and at that point it took the
view that “associations formed to disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda are not
educational within the meaning of the statute.”  T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 285
(1919); see Houck, supra note 99, at 9.  This, however, was merely an attempt to define
what was educational, and it was only in 1934 that Congress added an independent limit on
lobbying by tax-exempt organizations.  Stanley, supra note 99, at 242.
Thus, the term “propaganda,” which echoed anti-Catholic ideas, was first introduced
into federal tax law in 1919, and already shortly afterward was applied to a wide range of
organizations, including the decidedly non-Catholic Birth Control League. See Slee v.
Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930).  Again, however, the broader application of the
propaganda restriction to non-educational organizations, and its establishment of an inde-
pendent limit, occurred only in 1934.
116 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934) (statement of Sen. Reed); Houck, supra note 99, at
19–20; see also Gaffney, supra note 99, at 23.
Reed, incidentally, rejected anti-Catholic political attacks, such as the condemnation
of Al Smith by Methodist Episcopal Bishop Adna W. Leonard. Bishop’s Anti-Catholicism
Deplored by Protestants—Senator Reed of Pennsylvania and Dr. Butler of Columbia Condemn It,
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zations he disliked—would never again unduly interfere in what he
considered congressional business.  Thereafter, idealistic organizations
would hesitate before substantially devoting themselves to petitioning
Congress.
In 1954, Senator Lyndon Johnson similarly responded to opposition.117
He was running in the Texas Democratic primary against a local Catholic,
Dudley Dougherty, who “was one of the first Catholics to run for state-wide
office in the State of Texas.”118  Johnson’s allies and probably Johnson him-
self therefore worried about religious opposition.  For example, his religious
supporters circulated ugly warnings about Catholic opposition, primarily
from “the Roman Catholic Mexican vote.”119  More centrally, Johnson faced
severe criticism from conservative anticommunist groups, especially the Com-
mittee for Constitutional Government, which was a tax-free educational
organization.120  During the campaign, therefore, in June 1954, Johnson
arranged for Representative John McCormack—the Senate Democratic
Whip—to ask the Commissioner of the IRS to reconsider this group’s
exempt status.121  The Commissioner, however, concluded that the Commit-
tee had not violated the prohibition on lobbying.122
Johnson reacted in the same way as Reed—by seeking to ensure that
idealistic organizations would never again interfere, only this time in elec-
tions rather than legislation.  This was the beginning of § 501(c)(3)’s restric-
tion on campaigning, and ever since, churches, schools, and charities have
had to silence themselves in elections or be taxed for exercising their consti-
tutional freedom.
In 1987, a final touch was added to § 501(c)(3).  Johnson’s election-
eering restriction had focused on campaigning “on behalf of any candidate
for public office,” and some conservative tax exempt organizations therefore
carefully campaigned against incumbents without campaigning for any par-
ticular candidate.123  Although Senator Howard Metzenbaum complained to
the IRS without avail, Congressman J.J. Pickle—one of LBJ’s prote´ge´s—more
successfully held hearings on the subject.  The result was to amend
BULL. OF THE CATHOLIC LAYMEN’S ASS’N OF GA., Jan. 22, 1927, at 5, available at http://
scr.stparchive.com/Archive/SCR/SCR01221927p05.php.
117 James D. Davidson, Why Churches Cannot Endorse or Oppose Political Candidates, 40 REV.
OF RELIGIOUS RES. 16, 17 (1998); Deirdre Dessingue Halloran & Kevin M. Kearney, Federal
Tax Code Restrictions on Church Political Activity, 38 CATH. LAW. 105, 106–08 (1998); Patrick
L. O’Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical Perspective of the Permeable IRS Prohibition
on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733, 740–52 (2001); see also Judith E. Kindell &
John Francis Reilly, Election Year Issues, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFES-
SIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR 2002, at 335, 336–37 (2002),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici02.pdf.
118 O’Daniel, supra note 117, at 769.
119 Id. at 748 (quoting Letter from Rev. Lewis L. Shoptaw (undated)).
120 Id. at 743.
121 Id. at 763.
122 Id. at 764–65.
123 Id. at 740 (quoting 100 CONG. REC. 9604 (1954)).
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§ 501(c)(3) so that it restricted idealistic organizations campaigning “on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”124
It would easy to assume that Reed, Johnson, and Pickle suppressed ideal-
istic organizations merely out of personal resentment.125  Their responses,
however, probably should be understood in the context of their broader
notions about the acceptable parameters of political debate.  Indeed,
because they obtained the support of their fellow legislators, their proposals
need to be recognized as expressions of a widely shared cultural response.  It
therefore is necessary to dig deeper—to examine the underlying anxieties
and prejudices that induced many Americans to embrace § 501(c)(3)’s
severe restrictions.
Anti-Catholic Anxieties.  Not far beneath the surface of § 501(c)(3) have
been widespread concerns about religious and other idealistic organizations.
These anxieties initially resulted in attempts to exclude Catholic organiza-
tions from the political process, but they soon reached other, mostly commu-
nist-influenced organizations, and by the mid-twentieth century such
anxieties laid a foundation for excluding a wide range of churches and other
idealistic organizations from central aspects of political participation.  Anti-
Catholic fears, tropes, and code words laid a foundation for more ecumenical
liberal anxieties about idealistic organizations.
Fears about Catholic political influence have long been commonplace
among American Protestants, and such fears established the language of
exclusion that would become part of § 501(c)(3).  It is well known how nine-
teenth-century nativists and other Protestants attempted to limit Catholic
political participation in the name of “Americanism.”126  Less familiar is that
this attack continued well into the twentieth century and that anti-Catholic
prejudice thus prepared the way for § 501(c)(3).127
An underlying concern was the old theologically liberal fear that the
Catholic Church exercised undemocratic ecclesiastical authority over its
members and thereby secured their unreasoned attachment to its orthodox-
ies.  On such assumptions, the Church’s authority interfered with the rational
and independent mental judgment of individual Catholics.128  Indeed, by
depriving Catholics of their independent judgment as citizens, the Church
acquired undue power in elections and thereby threatened American
“democracy.”129
124 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
125 On personal pique, see, for example, Carroll, supra note 99, at 250.
126 For the nineteenth century, see RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE
1800-1860, at 386–88 (1938); HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 234–38; GUSTAVUS MYERS, HIS-
TORY OF BIGOTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 166–74 (1943).
127 For the persistence of anti-Catholic prejudice into the twentieth century, see
HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 391–478.
128 For such fears, see id. at 194–202.
129 Id. at 249, 251, 402–05.
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Numerous Protestants, including prominent preachers, therefore pro-
tested against the danger of Catholic political “influence.”  According to
Henry Clay Morrison—the widely admired President of Asbury College, who
published Romanism and Ruin in 1914—the Catholic Church “proposes to
dictate the policies, the election of officials, the legislation and administra-
tion of the laws of this country.”130  Of course, he emphasized that he had
nothing against the rights of individual Catholics, but rather was concerned
about how the pope and his bishops were using “their political influence
where it can be used to best advantage to intimidate, and influence those
who make and enforce the laws of the land.”131
Another of the code words used by anti-Catholic writers was “propa-
ganda.”  It has seemed strange that § 501(c)(3) uses this word in its restric-
tion on lobbying or petitioning, but this should be no surprise.  Morrison, for
example, complained about the Church’s “powerful propaganda,” which it
was using “for the conquest of this country,” not least by “establish[ing] a
powerful lobby at our national capital.”132  Significantly, these sorts of com-
plaints came not merely from narrowly denominational quarters, but from all
sorts of theological liberals, including many nativists—as when The Protestant
(a nativist magazine published in Washington, D.C.) fretted that Catholic
newspapers and magazines “constantly ply the public with offensive and
defensive propaganda of the Roman hierarchy.”133  Similarly, the Ku Klux
Klan worried that “[t]he chief weapon of the enemies of the Klan and of
Americanism is propaganda.”134
In response to the allegedly antidemocratic authority and propaganda of
the Catholic Church, nativists and other theological liberals speculated about
how the Church could be induced to silence itself.  One such “liberal” was
Hiram Evans—the Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan.  In the 1920s, the
Klan had become the leading nativist organization in the United States, and
130 H.C. MORRISON, ROMANISM AND RUIN 12 (1914).
131 Id. at 33–34.
132 Id. at 147.  For another example, see MYERS, supra note 126, at 237.
133 Join the Great Crusade, 7 PROTESTANT 65, 66 (1927); see also Senator Heflin’s Great
Speech, 6 PROTESTANT 177, 177–79 (1927) (reiterating that newspapers and periodicals con-
stantly put forth propaganda of the Roman hierarchy).
134 THE KLAN IN ACTION: A MANUAL OF LEADERSHIP FOR OFFICERS OF LOCAL KLANS 19
(n.d.).  This source was distributed to local klans under a cover letter from Imperial Wizard
Hiram W. Evans.
Another Klansman who continued to worry about Catholic propaganda was Hugo
Black.  In 1968, he complained about a New York law:
The same powerful sectarian religious propagandists who have succeeded in
securing passage of the present law to help religious schools carry on their secta-
rian religious purposes can and doubtless will continue their propaganda, look-
ing toward complete domination and supremacy of their particular brand of
religion.  And it nearly always is by insidious approaches that the citadels of liberty
are most successfully attacked.
Bd. of Educ. of Central Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251–52 (1968) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
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thus a prominent purveyor of theologically liberal ideas in opposition to the
Catholic Church.  Although the Klan had nearly collapsed by 1930, Evans still
asserted its positions, repeatedly attacking the Church on “liberal” principles
for its threat to “democracy.”135  Of particular interest here is his publication
in 1930 of a book proposing action against the Church, and although it prob-
ably was not a source of § 501(c)(3), it is suggestive as what already was in the
air.
Evans suggested that the solution to Catholic power lay in clarifying the
legal rights of churches.  On the one hand, he wanted to stop Catholic politi-
cal influence and “propaganda.”136  On the other hand, he recognized that
Catholics had constitutional rights, and he therefore worried about the claim
of Catholics that, as he put it, “their political campaign against American
principles” should be “tolerated in the name of religion.”137  Taking this
question seriously, Evans thought it could be put to rest “by the simple pro-
cess of definition of rights.”138
Thus far, there had not been a clear enough “standard by which the
political activities of Catholicism could be measured against American princi-
ples.”139  Evans therefore closed his 1930 book by urging legislation to clarify
for the Church whether it would be “allowed to organize political machinery
on a religious basis” and whether it could “use its spiritual authority to coerce
voters or members who are in public office.”140
This is especially sobering in retrospect.  In 1930 the head of the KKK
argued for limits on how the Church could campaign and lobby, and in 1934
Congress began to impose such restrictions on religious and other idealistic
organizations.
Evans recognized he could not simply attack the Catholic Church, and
he therefore presented his proposal in anodyne language about churches in
general—about “codification of the rights and duties of churches under the
principle of the separation of Church and State.”141  He proposed that the
law should define “[t]he legal position of all churches in respect to the State,
to their members, and to each other, together with their duties toward the
State and the precise limits of their right to political activity either directly or
through religious power over their followers.”142  Put crudely, the goal was to
“hit political Catholicism.”143  Evans, however, understood the need to offer
a “political philosophy.”144  He therefore declared that “we must make
135 HIRIAM W. EVANS, THE RISING STORM 75–82, 129–46 (1977).
136 ID. at 299, 344 (regarding the “Roman campaign of propaganda, subversion and
political aggression”).
137 Id. at 335.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 336 (emphasis omitted).
141 Id. at 337–38.
142 Id. at 338 (emphasis omitted).
143 Id. at 342.
144 Id. at 337.
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Catholics know the American meaning of freedom, equality and Liber-
alism.”145  And this is what § 501(c)(3) would soon do.
Of course, not all theologically liberal critics of Catholicism were as
explicit as Evans in demanding limits on the speech of churches, and not all
were as obviously prejudiced.  But in this brief summary of the majoritarian
anxieties underlying § 501(c)(3), the Imperial Wizard’s proposal suggests
how liberal fears of Catholicism could provoke demands for the exclusion of
churches from the political process.
Anti-Catholicism thus provides an initial context for understanding
§ 501(c)(3).  Anti-Catholicism was not, by itself, the cause of this law’s exclu-
sion, but in the context of liberal fears about Catholic political “influence”
and “propaganda,” whether in campaigns or legislation, § 501(c)(3) begins
to make sense.  Among many nativists and, more generally, among a wide
range of theological liberals, there seemed a real danger to “democracy”
from the political speech of religious organizations—prototypically, Catholic
organizations.
Broader Liberal Anxieties.  This is not the place to explore the full extent
of the prejudices that underlay § 501(c)(3)’s restrictions, but the theologi-
cally liberal anti-Catholic anxieties broadened out to become liberal demo-
cratic anxieties about the political influence of all churches and other sorts of
other idealistic organizations.  Even in the ostensible breadth of these liberal
anxieties, however, the Catholic Church remained the model of the danger.
Many liberals increasingly excused their anti-Catholicism by pairing Catholic
and communist organizations as equal threats to American values, especially
democracy, but for many, the real source of anxiety remained the Church.
Paul Blanshard illustrates the point.  When he campaigned in the 1940s
and 1950s against the Church’s influence in America, he understood that he
could not expect to prevail by taking aim only at Catholicism.  He therefore
took the even-handed approach of damning both Catholicism and commu-
nism: “Vatican intervention in American life is no more welcome than Krem-
lin intervention and all true believers in freedom should oppose both types
of intervention.”146  On this assumption, Blanshard repeatedly wrote about
these two “alien and undemocratic powers, the Vatican and the Kremlin.”147
The implication was that Catholicism was antidemocratic and therefore
had to be constrained by the American majority.  In his 1949 volume Ameri-
can Freedom and Catholic Power, Blanshard wrote: “In a democracy, every group
145 Id. at 338.
146 Canon Law Clashes with U.S. Law, Poteat, Blanshard Tell Conference, CHURCH & STATE
NEWS. (Protestants & Other Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Washington,
D.C.), Feb. 1951, at 1, 3.
147 PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 260 (1949) (regarding
Hungary in 1949).  The first edition alone sold 240,000 copies. PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERI-
CAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (2d ed. 1958) (frontispiece).  It was a familiar trope.
For a slightly later complaint about “these two alien forces,” see DON W. HILLIS, THE BIG
QUESTION? . . . A VATICAN VICTORY IN THE U.S.A.? 16 (1959).
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that affects public policy must be accountable to the entire citizenry.  A
democracy cannot survive if Iron Curtains are placed around groups, secular
or clerical, that intervene in public affairs.”148  This message was recognized
to carry “ominous warnings” for Americans who cared about liberty—but
what seemed ominous to Blanshard and many liberals were the threats of
discordant political influence from left and right, not the threat to freedom
of speech.149  Thus, far from being beyond the pale, Blanshard’s book won
accolades, including praise from John Dewey for its “good judgment and
tact.”150
In 1951, Blanshard spelled out the implications.  In terms familiar from
foreign policy, his Communism, Democracy, and Catholic Power argued for “con-
tainment” of both communism and Catholicism.151  They both were “hostile
to our freedoms.”152  Accordingly, “[d]emocracy is inevitably bound by its
own self-interest to attempt the limitation of both Vatican and Kremlin power
to presently occupied territories because the two systems have been
encroaching on the democratic way of life.”153  Their encroachments took
different forms, and therefore required different responses, but both needed
“containment.”154
As with Evans, so with Blanshard, there is no reason to suspect direct
influence on § 501(c)(3).  Nonetheless, Blanshard’s writings illustrate the
sort of liberal conformism, increasingly advocated in the name of “democ-
racy” both against Catholics and against communists, that underlay
§ 501(c)(3)’s exclusion.  In this sort of context, one can begin to understand
why § 501(c)(3)’s exclusion of religious and other idealistic organizations
provoked hardly any disapproval.
Just as Part III observed how administrative directives exclude many
religious Americans from the lawmaking process, so here Part IV has shown
how § 501(c)(3) excludes religious organizations from that process.  And like
the administrative exclusion, the religious exclusion has been deliberate.  It
was quite intentional—both politically in Congress and culturally in the lib-
eral response to Catholic and communist organizations.  It therefore should
be no surprise that religious Americans have difficulty protecting their relig-
ious interests through the political process.  On the whole, they enjoy a relig-
ious liberty under equal laws, but they have deliberately been excluded from
equal participation in making and shaping the law.
The result for the First Amendment is a strange religious equality.  Most
laws impose their constraints equally on Americans without regard to their
148 PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (5th prtg. 1949) (dust
jacket).
149 Id.
150 Id.  Blanshard, of course, was not alone. See, e.g., George LaPiana, A Totalitarian
Church in a Democratic State: The American Experiment, 10 SHANE Q. 59, 59–143 (1949).
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religious beliefs.  Section 501(c)(3), however, singles out churches and other
idealistic organizations.  Religious Americans therefore do not enjoy an equal
freedom to participate in the political process that produces law, and they
thereby are deprived of the opportunity to moderate religiously burdensome
enactments.  Especially for Americans whose religious beliefs are orthodox or
otherwise are not aligned with popular political views, there can be profound
costs for their alleged religious equality.  Exclusion from the political process
means that even equal laws are apt to be religiously oppressive.
V. DIVIDING AMERICANS
Section 501(c)(3) creates divisions among organizations.  Of particular
interest here, it distinguishes idealistic organizations from self-interested
organizations—notably, business organizations—and thereby accords them
different degrees of speaking, petitioning, and other participation in polit-
ics.155  As a result, the exclusion of religious organizations through
§ 501(c)(3) reaches further than may be imagined.
By separating idealistic and business organizations in the political
sphere, § 501(c)(3) weakens at least religious organizations in their pursuit
of their religious ideals.  This is part of the broader phenomenon of forced
specialization in rights, a government-imposed fractioning of persons and
rights, which threatens the liberty of all sorts of Americans—in this instance,
the freedom of individuals to organize in politics in defense of religious
freedom.
A. Idealistic Organizations Divided from Business Organizations
Idealistic organizations—most profoundly, churches—once could find
allies in business organizations.  Both types of organizations could share relig-
ious goals (for example, about education or the moral conduct of business),
and they could pursue these ends together in politics.  Now, however, the
idealistic organizations cannot engage in central modes of political participa-
tion, and they therefore have little political strength to offer potential allies
in the business world.
Most businesses are not centrally concerned with religious or moral
goals, and it therefore has always been difficult enough for idealistic organi-
zations to form alliances with business organizations.  But where there were
overlapping goals, it was advantageous for the businesses to work with the
idealistic organizations, for both types of organization could equally engage
in political speech and petitioning, and businesses therefore could amplify
their shared messages by joining with the idealistic organizations.
155 Of course, there are other more-or-less self-interested organizations, such as labor
organizations.  Both business and labor organizations are idealistic in their own ways.
Labor organizations, however, like business organizations, specialize in representing partic-
ular economic interests, and they therefore are not treated by the government in the same
way as the prototypically idealistic organizations governed by 501(c)(3). See 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(5) (2012) (regarding labor organizations).
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As a result of § 501(c)(3), however, businesses now have much greater
freedom of political participation than idealistic organizations, and there-
fore, even when business organizations share religious or moral ends with
idealistic organizations, they have little to gain by seeking them out as allies.
Idealistic businesses often make charitable donations to idealistic organiza-
tions, but because of § 501(c)(3), they usually can no longer rely on the lat-
ter as equal or useful political allies.  Of course, there are prominent
exceptions, as when businesses seek out the persuasive power harnessed by
educational organizations, but although religious businesses often donate
money to religious organizations, they are not apt to view such organizations
as political participants and thus useful allies.
Religious organizations thereby often find themselves isolated, cut off
from other types of organizations that once might have joined them in relig-
ious or moral struggles.  The religious organizations therefore are much
weakened.  They not only have lost most of their freedom in political partici-
pation, but they also thereby have lost many of their allies in the business
world.
Idealistic organizations cannot even get much business support for their
constitutional rights of petitioning and political speech.  After more than a
half century of separate regulatory schemes for idealistic and business organi-
zations, these bodies have different interests in speech and petitioning, and
they are not apt to campaign together for such rights.
For example, there traditionally was only one freedom of speech.  This
was an equal limit on government, and it thus was the same freedom, regard-
less of the speaker.  As a result, all Americans and all American organizations
had a shared interest in preserving the freedom of speech, and although they
did not all support it, those who were denied their freedom could count on
finding support across different types of individuals and organizations.  In
other words, the equality of the right, including equal access to it, was a struc-
tural mechanism that ensured a shared interest in preserving it.
Nowadays, however, idealistic organizations—especially religious organi-
zations—often stand alone.  Having lost their freedom in the political
sphere, they also have lost their power in this realm, and they therefore can-
not count on the support of their potential business allies.
B. Fractions of Persons and Rights
Section 501(c)(3)’s division among organizations is part of a broader
array of divisions of persons, which forces them into specialized roles, or nar-
row aspects of themselves, with access to rights only along the lines of the
government-imposed specialization.  Put another way, § 501(c)(3) is part of a
tendency to reduce persons to fractions of themselves, with fractions of their
rights.  The U.S. Constitution, however, leaves no room for fractions of per-
sons and fractions of rights.
Forced Specialization.  Nowadays, it often is suggested that associations of
one sort or another are not fully persons and thus do not have complete First
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Amendment rights.  For example, in defense of attempts to constrain the
First Amendment rights of business corporations, it is said that they are only
partially persons, with only partial constitutional rights.156  Similarly, in
defense of § 501(c)(3)’s violation of First Amendment rights, it is assumed
that idealistic organizations, being associations rather than individuals, are
only partially persons, with only partial constitutional rights.  But it is unclear
how this strange reduction of persons and rights to fractions of themselves is
different from a violation of their constitutional rights.157
There is little pretense, at least among lawyers, that corporations are not
persons, as one of the most basic reasons for incorporation is to enjoy the
legal status of a natural person, with legal rights, including the right to sue
and be sued.  Indeed, it long was a fundamental legal assumption that per-
sons, whether individuals or corporations, could not be stripped of their
rights as persons.  The only exception was where, at the outset, an act of
naturalization or a charter of incorporation expressly stated a limitation, and
even this exception probably did not survive the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.158
156 See, e.g., Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Government at 3–11, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 678 (2013), (Nos. 13-354, 13-356). But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751, 2770–71 (2014) (not adopting such arguments).
157 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). The forced specialization is evident in the government’s
very definition of idealistic organizations as bodies “organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes”. Id.  Such a definition pressures Ameri-
cans to pursue such purposes in organizations narrowly focused only on such on ends.
This aspect of the forced specialization, however, need not be pursued here.
158 The standard American approach to corporations was that a corporation enjoyed
the same constitutional rights as any other person, without legal limitation, unless the limi-
tation was stated in its charter of incorporation.  Of course, a corporation, by its nature,
could not take advantage of habeas corpus and other rights that applied only to individu-
als, or natural persons, but unless an additional limitation was stipulated in its charter of
incorporation, it generally seems to have been taken for granted that a state could not
impose legal limitations on a corporation’s enjoyment of constitutional rights.
The fundamental character of the underlying principle is evident from its application
to individual citizens.  For example, in 1785, Massachusetts judges concluded, under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Articles of Confederation, that a state “Act of natu-
ralization, may admit an alien to certain privileges, and exclude him from others”—mean-
ing that “he may be naturalized under some particular disabilities”—“but if no such
proviso is made,” and thus “no condition expressly annexed to the privilege granted,” then
“ex vi termini [by force of the term] a person naturalized, is a free citizen to all intents
constructions and purposes whatever.”  Such persons, “from any class or denomination of
Aliens, are by the Confederation, considered as entitled to all the privileges, and immuni-
ties of free citizens in the several States; and of course in this commonwealth whenever
they shall come to reside within the same.” Opinion of Justices of the Supreme Judicial
Court on an Article of the Confederation (June 22, 1785) (docketed Oct. 19, 1785), Mass.
State Archive, Senate Documents, Rejected Bills, 1785, No. 344, Box 11 (emphasis omit-
ted).  Of course, one may reasonably doubt the constitutionality even of initial conditions
limiting the constitutional rights of naturalized aliens.  But the point here is more modest,
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Nonetheless, there increasingly have been suggestions that when individ-
uals work together in associations, they and their organizations enjoy only
specialized rights, as determined in accord with the specialized organiza-
tional purposes recognized by the government.  On this basis, it often is said
that individuals in business enjoy the free exercise of religion, but when they
join together in a business corporation, they have less of an interest in this
right—the assumption being that business corporations have only partial
religious interests.159  Similarly, it is said that religious individuals enjoy the
right of assembling to petition and the right of political speech, but that
when they join together in religious associations, they lose central aspects of
these rights—as if churches had reduced political interests.
This slicing and dicing of persons and rights suggests that business cor-
porations need to put aside their religious commitments and (more centrally
here) that idealistic organizations need to avoid engaging in central types of
political speech, whether campaigning or substantial petitioning.  When such
organizations fail to confine themselves in these ways, they are assumed to be
going beyond their specialized identities.  In the one instance, they are no
longer really business corporations, and in the other instance, they are no
longer really religious, educational, or charitable organizations.
This specialization is exactly what one would expect when a government
seeks to free itself from the ideals of its people.  As Tocqueville noted, Ameri-
cans can find strength in campaigning, persuading, and otherwise shaping
public opinion only by associating with others.160  Most members of Con-
gress, however, do not like being judged by the ideals espoused by Ameri-
cans, and it therefore is no surprise that Congress has suppressed the speech
and petitioning rights of religious and other idealistic organizations.
There commonly are complaints about the selfish character of American
business life and the loss of ideals in politics.  But should this be a surprise
when the government questions the religious potential of business corpora-
tions and denies political participation to churches and other idealistic
associations?
that where inequalities in constitutional rights are not imposed as initial conditions, they
cannot be imposed later.
It may be thought that, at least for corporations, mortmain statutes were an exception.
With one exception, however, in Pennsylvania, these sorts of general limitations on corpo-
rations do not appear to have been adopted in the early American states. 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA 57 (Francis Lieber ed., 1832); see also NATHAN DANE, 4 A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT
AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 5 (1824) (observing that mortmain statutes had not been
adopted in the New England states); JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 80 (Boston 1832).  Even the Pennsylvania mort-
main statute, moreover, merely limited corporate acquisition of land; it did not authoriz-
ing taking a corporation’s previously aquired property.  Act (April 1833), PL 167, in
PURDON’S DIGEST: A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, 320, § 27 (Philadelphia 1853).
159 See, e.g., Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Government, supra note 156, at 3–11.
160 See 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 62, at 129–35.
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This forced specialization in rights (whether imposed on churches or
businesses) is utterly contrary to the Constitution.  And of particular interest
here, its application in § 501(c)(3) divides American religious organizations
associations and individuals in ways that profoundly limit their ability to pro-
tect themselves from equal but religiously oppressive laws.
Fractions of Rights.  The message for religious organizations is strange.
They have constitutional rights in holding property.  If they wish, moreover,
they can engage in unrelated businesses and pay taxes on the income.  But
because they are organized and operated “for religious . . . purposes,” they
lose central political rights.161  Thus, they have the First Amendment’s free-
dom of religion, but in exercising this right, they must give up the First
Amendment’s freedom of speech.  They have a right to assemble to petition
God, but in exercising this right, they lose their right to assemble to petition
government.  They can enjoy only fractions of their rights.
The results are comic.  On the one hand, individuals and their associa-
tions can speak to and about God.  On the other hand, individuals and their
associations can speak to and about government.  And ambidextrous individu-
als can devote themselves to both types of expression—to both the religious
and the political.  But woe betide individuals when they associate to do both—
when they join together to devote themselves to petitioning, or speaking
about, both God and Congress!  That’s punishable.  Then, they have to sub-
stantially give up on addressing, or talking about, either God or government,
or pay a tax for the privilege of directing their words to or about both.
The very same constitutional amendment guarantees free exercise, free
speech, and the right to assemble to petition.  It says nothing about giving up
one right if you exercise too much of the others.  Nonetheless, current law
requires Americans who associate for religious ends to specialize in the exer-
cise of their rights; it requires them to confine their exercise of religion,
speech, and petitioning to religious ends, meaning merely religious, as
opposed to political, ends.  And if Americans who associate for religious ends
fail to specialize in this way, they lose their rights of speech and petitioning—
precisely on account of their religion—the result being a violation of all
three First Amendment rights.
The result is a constitutional magic trick.  You can enjoy all three First
Amendment rights—those of speech, petitioning, and religion.  But if you
mix these rights together in a church . . . drum roll . . . Voila! . . . All three
constitutional rights disappear!
Of course, the full extent of this trick—the loss of all three types of First
Amendment rights—gets played only on religious Americans who associate
together in a church.  The trick, moreover, has severe costs only for some—
probably only for some with orthodox notions of ecclesiastical authority or
with other views not aligned with popular opinion.  And they typically are so
stunned, they don’t quite know what has happened to them.  Many nonreli-
161 26 U.S.C. § 501(c).
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gious or theologically liberal Americans, in contrast, find the magic trick
admirable and applaud.
Fractions of Persons.  All of this treats religious associations, even religious
corporations, and the individuals who participate in them, as less than full
persons, this being the justification for according them less than full rights.
Traditionally, when religious associations were regarded as whole persons,
with full constitutional rights, many of them devoted a very substantial part of
their energies to petitioning Congress and campaigning for and against legis-
lators—most notably, in the struggle against slavery.  Now, however,
§ 501(c)(3) bars them from engaging in any campaigning and from devoting
any substantial part of their activity to petitioning.  Put another way, whereas
the Constitution once counted slaves as three-fifths of persons for purposes
of apportionment, § 501(c)(3) now counts idealistic associations as nonper-
sons for electioneering speech and as only some fraction of persons for pur-
poses of petitioning.162
The point obviously is not that churches, schools, and charities are being
treated like slaves; far from it.  Rather the point is conceptual: that the Con-
stitution does not allocate rights or recognize persons in fractions, for that
would be a way of justifying a denial of rights.  All sorts of unfree societies
have identified fractions of persons in order to give them only fractions of
rights—as when Latin American countries once distinguished quadroons,
octoroons, and so forth.  Liberal societies, however, as observed by Robert
Cottrell, distinguish simply between the free and the unfree, thus precluding
any intermediate status.163
162 On account of the vagueness of the “no substantial part” test, it is difficult to figure
out what percent of the right to petition, and of personhood, § 501(c)(3) leaves to
churches, schools, and charities.  One case, Seasongood v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir.
1955), requires the IRS to allow churches, schools, and charities to devote at least five
percent of their activity to petitioning or lobbying.
Incidentally, although the Supreme Court has upheld a severe congressional limit on
what veterans can spend to dispute their veteran’s benefits, that concerned only adminis-
trative proceedings for benefits, not judicial proceedings on constraints.  Walters v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).  Here, moreover, the congressional limit
bars not what is done in the necessarily constrained circumstances of an adjudication, but
what churches and other nonprofit groups can say outside institutions such as courts and
Congress.
163 For this point, and the Latin contrast, see ROBERT J. COTTROL, THE LONG, LINGERING
SHADOW 54 (2013); Robert J. Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cul-
tures of Racial Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76. TUL. L. REV. 11, 15–16 (2001).
Of course, American law traditionally distinguished between persons who owe alle-
giance, and who thus have the obligation and protection of the law, and those who do not
owe allegiance, and so are outside this obligation and protection.  Philip Hamburger,
Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1826 (2009).  This, however, was different from
the distinctions discussed by Cottrol.
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Thus, although the U.S. Constitution distinguishes persons and citizens,
it does not (any longer) deal in portions of them.164 Of particular signifi-
cance here, the First Amendment secures rights of speech and religion with-
out distinguishing between individuals and associations.  It thus does not
allow the government to deny portions of such rights to some associations, let
alone on the theory that they are not fully persons.165
Congress cannot limit any association to a mere portion of its constitu-
tional rights. Nor is there any excuse for this in the theory that, when an
association devotes itself to a specialized sphere of life protected by one con-
stitutional right, it no longer is a full person with the full range of constitu-
tional rights beyond its specialized slice of life.166  For example, when the
federal government cuts back on the petitioning and political speech of relig-
ious associations, it cannot justify this constitutional violation on the theory
that they are specialized persons with only specialized constitutional interests.
If the federal government could get away with this excuse, it would be able to
eviscerate constitutional rights and abandon one of the Constitution’s central
liberal principles, that there are no fractions of persons or of constitutional
rights.
The stakes are therefore high.  Under § 501(c)(3), religious organiza-
tions become mere fractions of persons, with only specialized fractions of
constitutional rights.  Such organizations are thereby prevented from engag-
ing in American society as whole persons, with the full range of human and
civic interests—as if a church had less of an interest in political speech than a
political association.  Under the Constitution, such things are left for God
and for individuals and their associations to decide, not government.
C. Separation of Church and State
In defense of § 501(c)(3)’s exclusion of churches from the political pro-
cess, one might protest that the section and its imposition of specialization
are in accord with the principle of separation of church and state.  Separa-
tion of church and state, however, developed as a theologically prejudiced
principle, and it still discriminates against religious organizations and the
individuals who pursue their religion through such bodies.  Rather than jus-
tify § 501(c)(3)’s exclusion of churches, separation actually confirms the
point here about the imposition of specialization and the resulting reduction
164 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (mentioning “citizens”); U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V
(mentioning “persons”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (mentioning both “persons” and
“citizens”).
165 Incidentally, because the First Amendment secures the right of the people to assem-
ble to petition government, one might think it confines this right to associations, but of
course even an individual can be denied the right to assemble with others to petition.
166 For the traditional assumption that individuals and corporations cannot be limited
to fractions of their rights on account of their identity, see supra note 164 and accompany-
ing text.  Of course, advocates of slavery took another point of view, and in any case there
have always been some qualifications—for example, those arising from questions of
competency.
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of religious organizations to fractions of persons with only fractions of consti-
tutional rights.
It is widely assumed that separation of church and state is an areligious
or at least theologically neutral principle.167  But separation of church and
state has a long history as a theologically liberal slogan against relatively
orthodox religious organizations and their adherents.168
A hint of this theological bent is evident already from the very words
“separation of church and state.”  Whereas the Establishment Clause limits
Congress and thus only a part of government, the principle of separation takes
aim at both religion and state—indeed, at a particular type of religion, the
church or (more generally) a church. The principle thereby tends to discrimi-
nate against religion.  In particular, it tends to distinguish between group
religion and individual spirituality in a way that discriminates against relig-
ious groups and their organizations—in contrast to individuals and individ-
ual spirituality.  Precisely by introducing this sort of discrimination into
constitutional debate, the phrase has seemed to imply that religious organiza-
tions should be excluded from central aspects of political participation.
Separation’s sharp theological edge is further evident from its history.
The principle first became part of general American public debate when,
during the 1800 election, Thomas Jefferson’s allies used versions of it to
delegitimize the right of his Congregationalist critics to campaign against
him.169  Later, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, nativists employed
it to exclude the Catholic Church and its members from political participa-
tion and government jobs, and this anti-Catholic usage made the principle
widely popular.170  Since the mid-twentieth century, however, the principle’s
more broadly antiecclesiastical implications have again come to the fore, and
the principle thus typically seems to reach not only the Catholic Church but
also Protestant and other religious groups.171  For example, the principle has
been used to justify § 501(c)(3)’s exclusion of religious organizations from
political participation.
167 The word “areligious” seems more accurate than “secular.”  The latter first acquired
currency in England in the 1840s through the efforts of George Jacob Holyoake, who pro-
moted this label precisely because it offered a more positive image than ordinarily was
enjoyed by atheists and agnostics. HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 294 & n.20.  The word
became popular in America beginning in the 1870s as a label for the theologically liberal
movement on behalf of a wide range of heterodox groups, including not only atheists but
also non-Christian Unitarians, adherents of Comte’s religion of humanity, spiritualists, and
many others. Id. at 294–95.  Especially in this American context, secularists were not so
much areligious, or anti-religious, as theologically liberal opponents of religious organiza-
tions and supporters of the separation of church and state. Id.  In short, secularism has
often been somewhat religious and even tinged with theological prejudice. Id. at 294–95,
491–92.
168 Id. at 481.
169 Id. at 130–43.
170 Id. at 193–251.
171 Id. at 476–77.
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Notwithstanding the shifts back and forth between a narrow anti-Catholi-
cism and broader theologically liberal animosities, there has been great con-
tinuity in how the principle of separation of church and state has been used.
All along, from the time of Jefferson to the present, the principle has given
forceful expression to liberal fears of ecclesiastical authority and the concom-
itant liberal demands for limits on the political participation of various relig-
ious organizations.  The target has sometimes been narrowly the Catholic
Church, and has sometimes been more broadly all religious organizations—
even all distinct religions.  But one way or the other, the principle has persist-
ently discriminated against religious organizations, especially to exclude
them from the political process and government benefits.
The apologists for § 501(c)(3) thus are correct in identifying the separa-
tion of church and state with the exclusion of religious organizations, but not
in assuming that this principle and its exclusionary implications are are-
ligious, unprejudiced, or neutral.  On the contrary, separation of church and
state has long been a theologically liberal excuse for imposing a narrow relig-
ious specialization on theological opponents, as when § 501(c)(3) denies
them their equal constitutional rights of political speech, of petitioning, and
more generally of political participation.
As a result, § 501(c)(3)’s imposition of specialization in the exercise of
rights cannot be justified on the spurious constitutional ground of separation
of church and state.  Instead, it is necessary to recognize the forced speciali-
zation for what it is: a means of reducing religious Americans, their religious
organizations, and their rights to mere fractions of themselves.  And
although the results are general, the adverse effects are often especially hard
where religious beliefs are relatively orthodox or otherwise are not aligned
with popular political opinion.  In short, the consequences are most pro-
foundly felt by Americans that worry a theologically liberal majority.
To divide and conquer is an ancient strategy, and by dividing idealistic
organizations—most notably churches—into fractions of persons with only
fractions of constitutional rights, § 501(c)(3) severely limits the ability of at
least some Americans to resist equal but religiously burdensome laws.  For
such persons, exclusion from the political process has seriously undermined
what is celebrated as religious equality.
VI. JUDICIAL REMEDIES
Finally, what are the possible judicial remedies?  The constitutional
problem arises from the combination of equality and exclusion—on the one
hand, freedom under equal laws, regardless of one’s religion, and on the
other hand, exclusion from the political process that produces law—and this
dual character of the problem complicates any strong conclusions about a
judicial remedy.  Nonetheless, where the exclusion is clear and consistent,
there is reason to question the equality of the resulting law, and on this basis
one can discern some potential judicial responses, most clearly against
administrative lawmaking that burdens religion.
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A. Statutory Burdens on Religion
The initial question concerns statutes.  Under the First Amendment and
current caselaw (as noted in Part II), where a statute does not discriminate
on the basis of religion, it is considered “neutral” or equal, and thus even
where it burdens religion, it ordinarily is upheld.  But what if § 501(c)(3)’s
exclusions from the political process render the statute’s equality illusory?  In
such circumstances, under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, per-
haps the judges should hesitate to uphold the statute.172
Section 501(c)(3) goes far in excluding churches from politics, and the
danger of inequality is therefore serious.  The exclusionary effect of
§ 501(c)(3), however, is not consistent.  In some instances, it excludes at least
some religious Americans from the political process leading up to congres-
sional enactments, but in other instances it does not, and it therefore often
will be very difficult for the judges to be confident as to when § 501(c)(3) has
had an exclusionary effect.
The implications for statutes are therefore mixed.  Where § 501(c)(3)
has excluded religious Americans from participating in the political process
leading up to the enactment of a statute, the statute may not really be neutral
or equal, and therefore, under Smith, the judges have reason to question
whether it is compatible with the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.
The judges, however, cannot simply assume that § 501(c)(3) has had an
exclusionary effect on religious Americans, and it therefore is unclear how
the judges ordinarily could be confident that religious Americans were really
excluded from the process that produced any particular statute or that the
statute is really unequal.  The exclusion under § 501(c)(3) thus does not nec-
essarily point to a remedy against statutes.
At least, however, judges should be honest about the exclusion and its
threat to equality under statutes.  The courts are largely responsible for the
inequality, for they have acquiesced in the imposition of § 501(c)(3)’s uncon-
stitutional restrictions on speech, petitioning, and religion.  In other words,
they have legitimized the exclusion from the political process, and they
thereby have helped to render equal statutes oppressive.  The courts there-
fore should at least be candid about the problem.  Even if they cannot rem-
edy it, they should acknowledge it.
B. Administrative Burdens on Religion
A second question focuses on administrative acts, and here redress is
much clearer.  At least for the administrative exclusion, there is a clear path
toward a remedy.
Binding administrative “law” (whether in the form of regulations, inter-
pretations, guidance documents, exemptions, waivers, or adjudications)
comes from unelected persons, and in this way Americans are systematically
excluded from voting for their administrative lawmakers.  And because of the
172 U.S. Const. amend 1.
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scientific and rational ambitions of administrative power, this exclusion is apt
to be especially hard on Americans with religious beliefs, or at least on those
with religious beliefs that depart from administrative scientism and central-
ized rationality.  The administrative exclusion, moreover, including its harsh
effect on religious Americans, is accentuated by § 501(c)(3), which limits the
ability of religious Americans to persuade Congress and the President—the
bodies that supposedly oversee administrative power.  For all these reasons,
even when administrative “law” appears religiously equal, the administrative
exclusion of Americans from the lawmaking process means that, in reality,
such law is apt to be unequal for many religious Americans.
This exclusion from administrative lawmaking is therefore in tension
with the Free Exercise Clause.  When the Supreme Court in Smith laid out
the fundamental principle that neutral or equal laws are compatible with the
Clause, it buttressed this conclusion by noting that religious Americans can
participate in the political process that produces the laws.173  In Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court added that even if a law is
facially neutral or equal, there are circumstances in which it cannot really be
considered religiously neutral or equal.174  From this perspective, when
administrative lawmaking excludes religious Americans from participation in
the process that produces administrative law (whether rules, interpretations,
etc.), it calls into doubt whether these “laws,” even if superficially equal, are
really equal or neutral, as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
Unlike the inequality in the making of statutes, this inequality in admin-
istrative lawmaking clearly and consistently points to a judicial remedy.  In
contrast to statutes, administrative lawmaking is predictably affected by the
exclusion, for administrative power always excludes Americans from voting
from their administrative lawmakers.  Administrative edicts, moreover, are
not statutes, and thus are not themselves law, but rather are merely executive
acts, and they therefore must meet higher standards than statutes—as speci-
fied in the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard
and in the limits on judicial deference.175  Judges thus must respond differ-
ently to statutes and to administrative acts.  Even where they must sustain
statutes under the Constitution, they often (under statutes and judicial doc-
trine) must refuse to sustain administrative lawmaking.
Significantly, administrative lawmaking is not what the First Amendment
addresses when it declares that “Congress shall make no law.”176  Laws made
by Congress are those made by the people’s elected legislators, and the First
Amendment was adopted on the assumption that Americans would be bound
only by such rules as were adopted by Congress, not by administrative edicts.
173 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
174 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
175 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see also United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (recognizing and limiting respect for agency
interpretation); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 865
(1984) (recognizing and limiting deference to agency interpretation).
176 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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The First Amendment itself thus suggests that the courts should recognize
the threat from administrative lawmaking.
In fact, there are hints that the courts, in carrying out Smith, already are
quietly heading in this direction.  Many of the recent conflicts between law
and religious belief have arisen not from the supreme law of the land, but
from mere administrative lawmaking—whether done through rules, interpre-
tations, guidance documents, exemptions, waivers, or adjudications—and the
courts in such cases have tended to be unusually solicitous of the religious
claims.  Although such cases often are based on concerns about “individual-
ized exemptions,” they more generally reveal concerns about “neutrality” or
equality in administrative lawmaking.  Hence, the courts’ different treatment
of statutory and administrative exemptions. Where statutes allow nonreli-
gious exemptions, courts do not ordinarily assume that there is any inequal-
ity, but where administrative rules, etc. allow nonreligious exemptions, or
where administrative adjudications amount to individualized decisions about
exemptions, the courts are apt to find the administrative edicts unequal and
unlawful.177  Evidently, administrative lawmaking is different from statutory
177 The contrasting treatment of statutes or ordinances on the one hand, and adminis-
trative rules on the other, can be illustrated by at least some cases.
On the one hand, there are cases upholding statutes and ordinances. See Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999) vacated for lack of ripeness,
220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding a statute barring housing discrimination on basis
of marital status, which exempted real property for singles or couples only, and upholding
a city ordinance barring such discrimination, which exempted landlords sharing space with
renters, neither of which granted religious exemptions); Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous.
Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996) (holding that state statute barring housing discrimina-
tion against unmarried cohabitants did not impose a substantial burden in violation of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874
P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994) (holding that state statute and local ordinance barring housing
discrimination against unmarried cohabitants did not impose a substantial burden in viola-
tion of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
On the other hand, there are cases providing relief (a) against administrative rules
that offer only nonreligious or very narrow religious exemptions and (b) against adminis-
trative acts that amount to individualized decisions about exemptions. See Fraternal Order
of Police Newark Lodge 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding uncon-
stitutional an internal police order barring police officers from having beards that granted
medical exemptions, but not religious exemptions); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540
(D. Neb. 1996) (holding unconstitutional a state university’s decision denying a religious
exemption from its housing policy where the university granted exemptions for nonreli-
gious reasons); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 537 (holding an
ordinance unconstitutional because it “requires an evaluation of the particular justification
for the killing,” and this “represents a system of ‘individualized governmental assessment of
the reasons for the relevant conduct’” (citation omitted)).  Somewhat similarly, in Gonzales
v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), the Supreme Court
allowed an exemption from the Controlled Substances Act where the statute contained a
provision authorizing the Attorney General to “waive the requirement for registration of
certain manufacturers, distributors, or dispensers if he finds it consistent with the public
health and safety.” Id. at 432 (citation omitted).  This provision and especially the grant of
an exemption under it were indicia that cut against the claimed government interest.
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lawmaking, and the heightened sensitivity about equality in administrative
cases suggests the underlying significance of exclusion.
The importance of the administrative exclusion as the basis for the
heightened sensitivity has not thus far become explicit in the cases.  It
should, however, be brought to the surface, as it offers valuable clarification.
At the very least, the exclusion is helpful in understanding administra-
tive exemption cases.  For example, where a statute bars policemen from
wearing beards, the legislature should be able to grant a medical exemption,
without also giving a religious exemption, and this statutory medical exemp-
tion should not provoke the courts to grant a religious exemption on the
ground that the existing exemption is unequal.178  But when an administra-
tive “lawmaker” grants so limited an exemption, the danger of inequality
deserves and usually gets judicial attention, for the administrative lawmaker is
unelected, he is apt to be indifferent to religious concerns about freedom,
and the exclusion of religious Americans even goes so far as to bar many of
them from participating in the political process that oversees the administra-
tor’s decisions.179
The exclusion and the consequent inequality in administrative lawmak-
ing, however, is not confined to unequal administrative exemptions; it also is
a problem with all administrative lawmaking, including general administra-
tive rules, interpretations, and guidance documents.  Administrative lawmak-
ing excludes Americans from electing their administrative lawmakers, and it
is made from a perspective that deliberately and systematically excludes many
religious concerns that would arise in congressional lawmaking.  Americans
thus are subject to general administrative edicts that are facially equal but in
reality very unequal.  Accordingly, where administrative lawmaking of any
sort bears down hard on religious belief, the judges should recognize that
this cannot be dismissed as an accident.  On the contrary, it is exactly what
one would expect where Americans are excluded from electing their admin-
istrative lawmakers, where administrative lawmaking is designed to be indif-
ferent or even antagonistic to much religious belief, and where recourse to
Congress is minimal because religious organizations are excluded from
campaigning and substantial petitioning.
In sum, even facially equal administrative lawmaking is apt to be unequal
for at least some religious Americans, and judges therefore should not
assume that facially equal administrative lawmaking is really equal.  In terms
of precedent, they should recognize that the political participation logic that
In fact, some of the most notable pre-Smith Supreme Court exemption cases—Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)—involved administrative adjudica-
tions about unemployment benefits under a vague statutory standard of “good cause,”
these being the source of what Justice Scalia has called a “system of individual exemptions.”
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (1990) (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (opinion of
Burger, C.J., joined by Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.)).
178 Cf. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 717.
179 Cf. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 12, 170 F.3d at 360.
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underlies Smith does not apply to administrative lawmaking.  Indeed, in
applying Smith, they should be suspicious of the purported equality of admin-
istrative rules, interpretations, etc. when they conflict with religious belief.
Exactly how the courts should temper the administrative oppression may
vary from case to case.  Depending on the circumstances, where administra-
tive lawmaking impinges on religious beliefs, a court may conclude that such
lawmaking violates the Free Exercise Clause, that it violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, that it is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, that it does not qualify for Chevron deference or Mead respect,
that it violates a statute such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or at
least that the enforcement of the administrative lawmaking should not have
the benefit of equitable or other discretionary remedies.
Of course, the courts will not always be able to offer relief from the
administrative oppression created by the exclusion.  As with statutes, how-
ever, so with administrative lawmaking, the courts always should be honest
about the danger of the exclusion from the political process and the costs for
the liberty enjoyed under apparently equal laws.  And even where the courts
would enforce statutory burdens on religion, they should hesitate before
enforcing equivalent administrative burdens on religion.
C. Constitutional Questions
In the end, the courts cannot evade the underlying constitutional ques-
tions about administrative power and about § 501(c)(3).  Those questions
cannot be examined here, but nor can they be ignored, for it is not enough
to address the implications for religious liberty in a piecemeal manner.  More
basically, the courts need to protect Americans in their political
participation.
Thus far, however, the courts have legitimized the exclusions from the
political process.  The courts have acquiesced in the establishment of the
administrative state in which Americans cannot vote for or against their
administrative lawmakers.  The courts also have accepted § 501(c)(3),
thereby cutting religious organizations out of much of the political process.
In both ways, the courts have participated in excluding Americans, including
religious Americans, from the political process that gives rise to legislation,
and the courts therefore need to reconsider what they have done.
On account of the exclusion from the political process, there is no jus-
tice in enforcing religiously burdensome administrative regulations.  Nor is
there justice enforcing religiously burdensome statutes where the affected
Americans have been excluded from political participation by § 501(c)(3).
The courts, therefore, most fundamentally need to reevaluate their acquies-
cence in each element of the exclusion.
CONCLUSION
Exclusion from the political process is a central question in American
law.  Thus far, however, it has not been recognized how religious Americans
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are excluded from the political process and what this means for religious
equality.
Both administrative lawmaking and § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code substantially exclude religious Americans from the political process
that produces laws.  As a result, apparently equal laws are apt, in reality, to be
unequal for religious Americans.  Political exclusion threatens religious
equality.
The exclusion imposed by § 501(c)(3) is often justified as a sort of spe-
cialization, in which Americans are told that, when they join together in the
exercise of their First Amendment rights, they have only fractions of their
rights, as if they were only fractions of themselves.  The U.S. Constitution,
however, leaves no room for fractions of persons and fractions of rights.
The exclusion and its consequences for religious liberty therefore can-
not be ignored.  On the contrary, the exclusion must be integrated into
accounts of religious liberty.
The primary practical conclusion concerns administrative power.
Although courts already respond to some of the inequalities in administrative
burdens on religion, they should more directly and systematically recognize
how, on account of the exclusion, even apparently equal administrative law is
apt to be unequal.
Conceptually, the implications are even broader.  The free exercise of
religion tends to be understood in terms of a binary choice between equality
or exemption, but the equality is undermined by the exclusion of religious
Americans from the political process.  The conceptual framework for under-
standing religious liberty should therefore be expanded to recognize how
exclusion tilts the entire game, giving even facially equal laws an underlying
slant.
Less Equal than Others.  American are told that they enjoy religious equality,
equal voting rights, equal protection of the laws, and the advantages of democracy
and political participation.  But at the same time they are excluded from partic-
ipating in administrative lawmaking, and churches are excluded from
campaigning and from any substantial efforts in petitioning.  This makes a
mockery of the right to vote.  It also makes a mockery of the religious liberty
enjoyed under equal laws.  The laws are equal and nondiscriminatory, except
that Americans and many of their organizations are excluded, even on relig-
ious grounds, from participating in the political process that produces the
laws.
In its free exercise cases, the Supreme Court tells religious Americans
that the Constitution gives them liberty under equal laws, and that for
exemptions and other relief from general laws, they must go to Congress.
But in its administrative cases the Court tells Americans that they must sub-
mit to rules made outside the political process, and in its tax cases it tells
churches that they cannot fully or equally participate in the political process.
The Court thus ratifies both elements of the exclusion without even pausing
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to consider what this means for the free exercise freedom to live under equal
laws.
In Animal Farm, the barnyard animals write a constitution on the barn
wall, ending with the commandment that, “All animals are equal.”180  Even-
tually, however, the pigs get up on their hind legs and presume themselves to
be better than the other animals.  Shortly afterward, the rest of the animals
awake one morning to find that the constitution has surreptitiously been
amended.  It now states, “All animals are equal.  But some animals are more
equal than others.”181  In our society, there also has been a surreptitious
amendment, and it makes an equivalent point: some Americans are less
equal than others.
Cultural Shift or Oppression?  It often is said that there has been a cultural
shift away from religion—or at least away from organized religion—and it
may be thought that this justifies the exclusion of religious organizations
from politics and the denial of religious exemptions.  Yet, whatever the real
character of the cultural shift, it itself is partly a product of the suppression of
religious voices in the political process.  When Americans have their hands
tied, and their churches are gagged, in the choosing and petitioning of their
lawmakers, the resulting laws inevitably will shape the culture against relig-
ious beliefs.  It therefore is merely circular to suggest that the ensuing cul-
tural shift justifies these laws.
In any case, it is utterly oppressive for popular views to justify the sup-
pression of Americans and their churches in the political process.  Americans
have a right to vote for their lawmakers, regardless of any contrary popular
opinion.  They and their religious organizations, moreover, have a right to
speak their minds, and to assemble to petition government, regardless of any
contrary popular opinion.  If cultural shifts justify denying basic constitu-
tional rights, then no Americans (except those that continually conform) can
be safe.
And this points to the most troubling problem: the underlying project of
depriving cultural and political opponents of their constitutional rights.
Administrative power was established as a means of withdrawing lawmaking
power from elected legislatures and thereby depriving the American people
of their right to elect their lawmakers.  Similarly, the restrictions in
§ 501(c)(3) were established as a means of preventing churches and other
idealistic organizations from campaigning and petitioning.  The exclusions
from the political process, in other words, have been instruments for denying
theological and political opponents their political freedom.
It therefore should be no surprise that the consequences have been
severe, and of particular interest here are the consequences for the free exer-
cise of religion.  This right, at least traditionally, is the freedom to live under
180 GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 21 (1946).
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equal laws, regardless of one’s religion.  The exclusion of religious Americans
from the political process, however, alters this equality, rendering it hollow.
The Unequal Republic.  The United States was established as a republic, in
which the people were governed by their elected legislature and were free to
speak in campaigns and to petition their government.  Unfortunately, most
blacks were enslaved, and even after they obtained constitutional equality—
equal protection of the law and equal suffrage—they were not always allowed
to vote.  This was formal equality combined with electoral exclusion, and the
results were predictably grim.
Now, there are equal rights in voting, but underlying types of exclusion.
The people finally are equally secured in suffrage, but their legislature does
not make all of their laws, and their churches (and other idealistic organiza-
tions) are substantially silenced.  The consequences are exactly what one
would expect when a boxer ties the hands of his opponent behind his back,
and the umpire declares, “Let the equality begin!”
All of this is ugly, and there needs to be an accounting.  Whether the
Supreme Court can repair the damage it and others have done is doubtful.
But it should make the effort, if only to moderate the blame it justly deserves
for having acquiesced in the oppression.
